TURKEY'S IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION DILEMMAS AT THE GATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

●

GAMZE AVCI
KEMAL KIRIŞCI*

ABSTRACT. This paper examines the emigration and immigration system of Turkey and its correlated visions of development. For that purpose, the paper will study the major characteristics and dynamics of emigration from Turkey into Europe (in particular Germany and the Netherlands), and the major impact on host societies as well as on Turkey. The analysis gives particular attention to the extent to which Turkish emigration and the Turkish Diaspora have influenced economic, political and social development in Turkey. In a similar manner, we will examine the evolving nature of immigration into Turkey. Finally, we give attention to the place of these issues in EU–Turkish relations. The parallel development of Turkish migrants becoming permanent residents in Europe and of Turkey receiving new – potentially permanent – migrants from its surrounding region are discussed with a close look at what kind of impact this has on Turkey itself.

KEYWORDS. Turkey–European Union integration, Turkish Diaspora, Turkish immigration.

* Gamze Avcı, Utrecht University, and Kemal Kirişci, Boğaziçi University. Email addresses: g.avci@ucu.uu.nl and kirisci@boun.edu.tr

INTRODUCTION

Emigration, immigration and development

The migration and development nexus in the Turkish case is a complex and unsettled one. Any attempt to understand it, requires an extensive look into the dynamics of both, emigration from and immigration into Turkey. In the 1960s, *emigration into Western Europe* started as a promising means for the development of Turkey and was also considered to be beneficial for the receiving European countries. The push–pull model was the driving vision behind policymakers' decision in Europe and Turkey to recruit and send guestworkers from Turkey. This model, which is primarily economic, identifies a number of pull and push factors, which are influential in shaping migration. Push factors, which motivate people to leave, are low living standards, demographic growth, lack of economic opportunities and political repression. Pull factors, which attract migrants, are the need for labor, availability of land, political freedoms and good economic opportunities. As a result of the movement, wages increase and the supply of labor decreases in the capital – poor country, while wages decrease and supply of labor increases in the capital – rich country. Migrants working in rich European countries are also considered a valuable source for development via remittances.

The results of the push–pull model are mixed for sending and receiving countries involved. A large part of the Turkish emigrants were relatively skilled workers who were not unemployed at the time they emigrated. Also, the export of labor accelerated the existing process of mechanization of agriculture in Turkish villages, and made more people available for emigration. As European countries stopped issuing new labor permits in the mid 1970s, emigration to Turkish cities rather than European countries began to speed up. The majority of the Turkish emigrants did not return. Few returning migrants tried to establish themselves as self–employed in small businesses relating to trade and service. Ironically, for this they did not need the qualifications learned during their work in industries in Western Europe. Contrary to conventional belief it seems that the incentives to attract emigrants' remittances have not been very successful. Research demonstrates that Turkish remittances have responded to changes in government in Turkey and hence to political confidence rather than to policies aiming to channel remittances through manipulation of either the exchange rate or the interest rate. Nevertheless, remittances overall have been very important for Turkey as an economic tool.

Diaspora formation, political interconnectedness and the transnational features of Turkish migrant communities have entered the picture as important political «remittances». The role of Turkish migrant associations and their link-

ages to Turkey have important political implication both in terms of both Turkey and the receiving countries. Many migrants are involved in political activities that influence and transcend both Turkey and the countries they live in. Some Turkish migrants or their descendants serve as members of parliaments at the local or national levels in European countries or in the European Parliament. At times the migrants are involved in political activities that have a direct bearing on Turkey's political transformation. Political movements ranging from Kurdish nationalism to Islamic fundamentalism in Europe have an impact on Turkish politics. Furthermore, an important proportion of this migrant community has been facing problems in adjusting and integrating themselves to their host societies. At a time when Turkey is starting accession negotiations with the European Union the presence and characteristics of this immigrant community is weighing heavily on EU–Turkish relations. Integration issues are critical as in many European countries anti–immigrant feelings especially towards Turks and Muslims are on the rise.

Since the 1960s, Turkish policymakers have perceived the European Union (EU) as an important tool for development. The idea has been that anchoring Turkey in the EU would ideally mean enhanced economic welfare and more or less linear democratization. In terms of migration, this would mean that with economic development there will be less economically driven migrants and with more democracy there will be less politically motivated asylum–seekers. Nonetheless, this view has not necessarily been mirrored on the EU–side. The EU's approach to candidate countries (in particular when it comes to migration) has been defined by security concerns. The main principle of the EU's immigration policy since the 1990s is the creation of a «buffer zone» in accession countries. This meant that candidate countries have to consider new visa requirements, establish bilateral readmission agreements between the EU and themselves, redefine with the help of EC funding and technical assistance the jurisdiction of immigration and border police authorities, be able to declare themselves as safe for the return or protection of refugees, and finally meet the condition that they implement the EU Justice and Home Affairs *acquis* before they join the EU. This has also been the case for Turkey.

Turkey has also a very rich history of immigration and –contrary to general belief– has actually always been an immigration country. Initially, immigration had taken the form of Turks and Muslims from the former Ottoman territories in the Balkans migrating to Turkey. It was very much encouraged by the Turkish state as part and parcel of a nation building exercise. Since the end of the Cold War, other movements such as asylum seekers have replaced this kind of immigration. Irregular migrants try to transit Turkey while others are either stranded or work as un– or semi skilled workers. There is also a growing number of Europeans settling in Turkey as professionals and retirees. Pendular migration between former Soviet Bloc countries and Turkey is becoming very common.

Trafficking in women as well as human smuggling are issues that are attracting growing governmental as well as civil society attention. These developments have very important economic and political developmental implications.

Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to examine the emigration and immigration system of Turkey since they are closely correlated to visions of development. For that purpose, the paper will study the major characteristics and dynamics of emigration from Turkey into Europe (in particular Germany and the Netherlands), its impact on host societies as well as Turkey. Particular attention will also be given to the extent to which Turkish emigration and the existence of a Turkish diaspora have influenced economic, political and social development in Turkey. In a similar manner the evolving nature of immigration into Turkey will be examined. Finally, attention will be given to the place of these issues in EU–Turkish relations. The parallel development of Turkish migrants becoming permanent in Europe and Turkey receiving continuously new – potentially permanent – migrants its surrounding region is discussed with a close look at what kind of impact this has on Turkey itself.

I. TURKISH EMIGRATION TO
WESTERN EUROPE

Turkish guestworkers

Turkish emigration to Western Europe is a textbook case for the transformation of small scale «temporary» guestworkers into a larger, diverse, and permanent immigrant population. Turkish labor movements to Europe started in the 1960s and peaked in the early 1970s. Push and pull forces could easily be identified in the countries of origin and destination. The workers were recruited via a series of bilateral agreements with Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, France and Sweden from 1961 to 1967. Germany is the most significant recipient country among them. By the same token, Turks still constitute the largest foreign group in Germany. Today, there are approximately 4 million Turks living in Europe, out of which close to 2.5 million live in Germany. Most of them came from small villages in central Turkey or along the Black Sea coast; those from large cities are in the minority. Some districts in central Turkey delivered large migrants over the years, dispersed over various European countries (i.e. Afyon) or some from specific villages concentrated in specific locations in European countries (i.e. people from Kulu in Sweden).

The predicted, mutually beneficial end result according to the push–pull model was not necessarily achieved in the case of Turkish emigration to Europe. Most Turkish guestworkers stayed in the host countries despite the expectation that they are temporary and will leave when economic conditions change.

Remittances – though substantial at times – did not lead to a take off in Turkey. Return migration and repatriation programs were not accomplished at the expected levels when they were initiated. Active recruitment ended, which is also apparent in the numbers of workers sent abroad via the Turkish Employment Service. According to the Turkish Ministry of Labor, between 1961s–1973s, 790,195 workers were sent abroad via the Turkish Employment Service (out of which 648,029 went to Germany). 99 per cent of these were destined to Europe. Among 1974s–1987s, 455,451 left the country but only 7 per cent went to Europe (9,888 to Germany). Remittances rose continuously (with ups and downs) since the 1960s. Return migration peaked in 1987 at 150,000 but since then has been steadily declining as well (OECD–SOPEMI, various years).

With the dramatic decline in employment–based migration in the 1980s, the composition of the Turkish population in Europe changed substantially. In the beginning, there was a notable imbalance in the structure of the Turkish population abroad. According to the Turkish Employment Agency, between 1961 and 1976, less than 20 per cent of all Turkish migrant labor was female. As a result of family reunification, a more even distribution emerged. This can be seen in the activity rates of the labor force or numbers of non–working dependents. Today family reunification remains the largest source of Turkish migration to Western Europe. Nonetheless, overall, «in the second half of the 1990s, there was a considerable decline in the family–related movement».

TABLE 1

Turkish Workers and Total Turkish Nationals Abroad, 1973–2003

YEARS	TURKISH POPULATION	TURKISH NATIONALS BROAD	(2)/(1)	TURKISH CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE	TURKISH WORKERS ABROAD	(4)/(3)
	(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)	
1973	38,072,000	948,531	2.49%	14,670,000	735,363	5.01%
1980	44,736,957	2,018,602	4.50%	17,842,451	888,290	4.98%
1990	56,473,035	2,539,677	4.49%	20,163,000	1,149,466	5.70%
1991	57,326,000	2,857,696	4.98%	20,145,000	1,250,964	6.20%
1992	58,584,000	2,869,060	4.89%	20,073,000	1,313,014	6.54%
2000	62,865,574	3,603,000	5.73%	20,025,000	1,180,420	5.89%
2001	65,380,000	3,619,000	5.53%	20,242,000	1,178,412	5.82%
2002	66,039,000	3,574,164	5.41%	20,287,000	1,194,092	5.89%
2003	69,584,000	3,576,804	5.14%	20,811,000	1,197,968	5.76%

Sources: Gökdere (1994), various reports of State Institute of Statistics (SIS) and State Planning Organization (SPO), Annual Reports of the General Directorate of Services for the Workers Abroad, Attached to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, MiReKoc.

TABLE 2

Distribution of Turkish Nationals Abroad by Host Countries, 2000–2003

HOST COUNTRIES	2000		2001		2002		2003	
	ABSOLUTE FIGURE	SHARE IN OVERALL TOTAL (%)	ABSOLUTE FIGURE	ABSOLUTE FIGURE	SHARE IN OVERALL TOTAL (%)	ABSOLUTE FIGURE	SHARE IN OVERALL TOTAL (%)	ABSOLUTE FIGURE
Germany	2110	59	1999	55	1999	55	53	1924
France	301	8	326	9	326	9	9	342
The Netherlands	300	8	320	9	320	9	9	331
Austria	138	4	140	4	134	3	3	131
United Kingdom	73	2	80	2	80	2	2	90
Belgium	71	2	56	2	56	*	1	46
Denmark	37	1	33	1	33	*	*	32
Sweden	36	1	36	1	36	1	*	32
Other EU	20	*	25	1	30	*	*	30
EU Total	3086	86	3 015	83	3019	82	82	2958
Switzerland	80	2	80	2	80	2	2	79
Other non–EU European Countries	25	1	30	1	11	*	*	25
EUROPE Total	3191	89	3 125	86	3086	85	85	3063
Saudi Arabia	115	3	100	3	100	3	2	100
Kuwait	4	*	3	*	3	*	*	3
Libya	3	*	2	*	2	*	*	3
Other Arab Countries	2	*	3	*	2	*	*	1
ARAB Total	124	3	108	3	107	3	3	107
Australia	51	1	54	1	54	1	1	56
Canada	35	1	40	1	40	1	1	40
USA	130	4	220	6	220	6	6	220
CIS	52	1	42	1	36	1	1	40
Others	20	*	30	1	46	1	1	50
Total	3603	100	3619	100	3574	100	100	3576

*Less than %1

Sources: General Directorate of Services for the Workers Abroad, Attached to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2001), MiReKoc.

ASYLUM AS A SOURCE OF MIGRATION TO EUROPE

Turkey has also been a country of origin for asylum seekers. The authoritarian and repressive aspects of the Turkish state have forced Turkish nationals and especially Kurds to seek asylum in mostly West European countries. Political disturbances in 1970s followed by the military intervention in 1980 led to an

ever–increasing number of especially leftists to flee Turkey. The adoption of a new constitution in 1983 and the return to civilian rule did not change this trend. Instead, the growth of violence in east and southeast Turkey as a result of the Kurdish problem, coupled by human rights violations, led to an increase in asylum applications by Turkish nationals. This was also aggravated by the fact that there were many Turkish nationals who were abusing of the «asylum» channel to make it to Europe as other ways of reaching Europe legally remained closed (Boecker, 1996, UNHCR, 2000). There were approximately one million Turkish nationals who sought asylum from West European countries between 1983s–2003s (Icduygu, 2005). Even though the recognition rates of refugees remained low, a great number of these asylum seekers were allowed to stay on in Europe for humanitarian reasons. Over the last few years asylum applications from Turkey have been falling while more and more rejected asylum seekers simply return to Turkey (see Table 3). Tighter asylum policies adopted by European governments play a role in this as well as the many political reforms adopted in Turkey that have significantly reduced cases of human right abuses and persecution. According to the UNHCR, between 2001 and 2005 the number of Turkish asylum–seekers has decreased by 61 per cent. At the same time the share these in the total of applications submitted has remained relatively stable.

TABLE 3

Turkish asylum applications submitted in Europe, 1990–2003

YEAR	NUMBER
1990	48,771
1991	45,492
1992	37,121
1993	25,499
1994	26,124
1995	41,385
1996	38,462
1997	33,200
1998	21,770
1999	19,724
2000	28,219
2001	30,148
2002	28,455
2003	23,321

*Figures for Europe are for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. *Source:* UNHCR

Family reunification and
family formation

Family re–unification in the 1970s allowed for a more even balance among Turkish migrants in Europe. Initially there were more men than women. Nonetheless, today there is a rough even share between the two genders. The phase of *family reunion* migration of

Turks in the late 1960s and the 1970s, was followed by an increasing *family formation* migration in the 1980s. Since the 1980s, the number of Turks that have come via family reunification programs has declined over the years. Instead family formation is more and more outnumbering family reunification.

Family formation is largely due to spouse migration. For example, in the Netherlands in 2002 and 2003, three out of ten immigrants arrived for family formation. In 1995–2003 period, family formation migration to the Netherlands rose by more than 8 thousand, which makes it the largest category of immigrants. One in four immigrants comes to the Netherlands to marry or live with someone already there. Most family formation immigrants, one in three in 2003, come from Turkey and Morocco. In 2001, 3.3 thousand Turkish people came to the Netherlands to form a family, respectively family reunification from Turkey for the same year was 1.0 thousand. Second generation Turks and Moroccans also prefer partners from their home countries. Since 1996 family reunion migration to the Netherlands has declined. In Germany, granted visas for subsequent immigration of dependents from Turkey (in all categories i.e. wives of foreign husbands, husbands to foreign wives, husbands to German wives, wives to German husbands and children under the age of 18) totaled in 2003 to 21,908 and in 2004 it was 17,543.

The choice of the second generation to «import» their wives or husbands from Turkey is a contested issue in the receiving countries and has led to restrictive admission criteria in terms of income, accommodation, waiting periods and recently also language requirements. In the Dutch case, spouses have to take and pass a Dutch language exam already in the country of origin. The argument against family formation migration is that with continuous migration from Turkey the integration process is prolonged and never ends.

INTEGRATION DEBATES AND SELECTED
«CLASSIC» INDICATORS OF INTEGRATION

There is an important degree of divergence among integration policies in the various receiving countries in Europe. National approaches differ based on the historical experience of and thinking on national identity, citizenship and the

role of the state. There are also different understandings about what it means to be a participating member of society. When it comes to discussions around integration, typically countries focus on classic key indicators of integration, such as labor market participation and education, but recently also more controversial ones such as naturalization and dual citizenship, political participation, use of homeland–originated media and levels of intermarriage are brought up in national debates.

Unemployment

Integration policies are first and foremost focused on increasing labor market participation and educational attainments among the second generation of migrants (Doomernik). The underlying idea is that integration without labor market participation is very difficult. In 1960s immigrant workers were hired because the labor market in Europe was booming. They got jobs in industries with low paid labor. This changed in the early 1970s. For example, since the beginning of this decade, the Dutch labor market has undergone radical changes: the share of part–time has more than doubled, the share of flexible employment contracts has doubled and the female participation ratio has increased from 26 percent in 1970 to 57 percent in 1998. At the same time, the share of immigrants in the Dutch labor force has risen from 7.8 percent to 9.3 (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1998). During this period, the Dutch economy went through a process of radical post–industrial restructuring, resulting in high levels of unemployment that reached double–digit levels in the mid–1980s. Since the industries with low–paid labor were predominantly affected by the economic recession of the 1980s, many immigrant workers lost their jobs and became long–term unemployed.

The labor market position of many immigrant workers is weak because of their low educational level and lack of language skills. Although it seems that Turkish workers usually have higher unemployment rates than the natives, it is also quite difficult to compare rates across countries. The Dutch German example illustrates that very well.

Comparing the Dutch and German case is difficult since there are different ways of looking at it. In the Netherlands, the unemployment rate among ethnic minorities has gone down substantially since 1995. Still, the unemployment rate for Turks in the Netherlands is almost three times as much as the Dutch average. At the same time, only 8 percent of the Dutch Turks are unemployed (compared to 18 percent in Germany). In Germany, the Turks have twice more unemployment than the natives but about 18 percent of German Turks are unemployed. Of course, one important consideration for both cases is that integration policy cannot be decoupled from larger economic policies and should be evaluated in a grander scheme than just integration policy.

Self–Employment

In Europe, similar to the North American experience, self–employment among immigrants has been growing steadily. This is often seen as a positive sign. Immigrants of Turkish descent have also increasingly turned to self–employment. Nonetheless, one has to be very careful with self–employment among Turks: Despite a declining failure rate and a small tendency toward diversification, immigrants are still overrepresented in the cleaning, retail, and restaurant trades, as they tend to reproduce the entrepreneurial strategies of fellow countrymen. As a consequence, immigrant entrepreneurs are primarily active in markets that are easily accessible and have a low–growth potential. This implies that due to crowding–out effects their existence as entrepreneurs is uncertain. This leads to a relatively high failure rate, low profitability, long working days and weeks, and a high level of informality.

TABLE 4

Turkish Labor Force in the EU (2002), in 1,000s

COUNTRY	TURKISH POPULATION	EMPLOYED	SELF EMPLOYED
Belgium	110	35	2.3
Denmark	53	21	1.0
Germany	2,637	842	56.8
France	367	120	8.2
The Netherlands	270	92	6.0
Austria	203	73	5.0
Sweden	40	17	0.9
UK	70	30	1.6
Other EU countries	0.5	0.6	0.6
EU15	3,767.0	1,237.0	82.3

Source: Center for Turkish Studies, Essen

Turkish immigrant entrepreneurs in the Netherlands have increased over time. Their absolute numbers were 1,895 in 1986–7, 5,385 in 1992, 6,561 in 1998 and 9,047 in 2000 (Tillaart, 2001). The respective numbers for Dutch were 28,748 (1992), 35,796 (1998) and 43,926 (2000).[1] In Germany, it is estimated that in 1998, there were 51,000 businessmen of Turkish origin, providing jobs to 265,000

---

[1] There are no numbers available for the total Dutch economy in 1986–7.

persons. This represents 18.3 percent of the total number of economically–independent non–Germans (Zentrum fuer Tuerkeistudien, 1999).

Education

Relevant indicators for educational status are school attendance rates, educational performance of school pupils and students, highest educational attainments of graduates and dropouts, dropout percentages and repeater rates. Crul and Vermeulen have done the most extensive research on the second generation Turks in Europe (Crul and Vermeulen). In their work they state that comparing the different European countries is extremely difficult. To the extent a comparison can be made, the emerging picture is fairly mixed. There are large differences in the schooling experience of second–generation children. In France, Belgium and the Netherlands, between one third and one half of the second generation Turks begin their secondary school careers in lower vocational school, whereas in Germany, Austria and Switzerland the figure is between two thirds and three quarters. This overall lower level of qualification results in difficulties when entering the labor market and therefore ultimately influences their prospects for economic success. At the same time it can be observed that the Turkish second generation in France also has higher school dropout rates than in other countries. Of the second–generation Turkish young people in France who have already ended their school careers, almost half have gained no secondary school diploma at all, compared to only one third in the Netherlands and substantially fewer in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In the latter three countries, the majority of Turkish second–generation children enter an apprenticeship system that enables them to work and study while gaining job qualifications and experience. Turkish schoolchildren generally reach a lower level of education. Turkish children are over–represented in special education classes designed for children with learning disabilities

Since 1985, the Educational Priority Policy (EPP) has been in effect in the Netherlands. This policy is aimed at reducing the educational disadvantage of children due to their social, economic and cultural circumstances. In terms of education, two big problems stand out for the Turkish community. A high percentage of people (between 15–24 years) leave secondary school without any qualifications. There is a relatively low level of participation of Turks in higher education. «Black schools» are a problematic phenomenon. Furthermore, many Turkish kids have problems with the Dutch language (Lindo, 2000). Analyses show that social class largely determines test results (Driessen and Dekkers, 1997). As most Turks (and Moroccans) belong to the lowest socio–economic category, the factor of ethnic origin is so closely intertwined with the factor of social class that it is not really possible to differentiate the two. Gender barely plays a role, while the influence of ethnic origin is also limited (Crul, 2000).

The children of first generation Turkish migrants are now adolescents. They are at a stage where they are now moving into the labor market or completing their education. Research in this field cautiously points to an optimistic change among the second generation (Crul 1998). There are fewer dropouts and more students in higher education. It can be observed that there is a gradual inter–generation change to higher education levels (Ode 2002, p. 50). Given that «education is the prime factor for the socio–economic position of the minorities in the Netherlands, particularly for the second generation minorities» (Ode, 2002, p. 109), this is promising. However, there is still much to be desired in terms of education achievements.

In Germany the situation is not much different when it comes to the performance of Turkish students in the educational system. While almost a quarter of all Turkish students go to the *Hauptschule*, the lowest track of secondary education (and only 13 percent of all West–German students do), the situation is the opposite with regard to the *Gymasium*: almost a quarter of the latter attend this most advantageous school type whereas only 6 percent of Turkish students do so. There is also a higher probability that Turkish students end up in the *Sonderschule*, which are special schools for pupils with learning disabilities. The lack of language skills makes it more likely for Turkish students to end up in these special schools (see also Oezcan and Soehn, 2006).

<div align="center">

CONTESTED FEATURES
OF INTEGRATION

</div>

An entire literature has grown up in the social sciences around the concept of «transnationalism». What it in effect means is that people can move easily between different national, linguistic and cultural spaces; while keeping professional and family contacts in each. Integration is no longer spatially bounded in the way it was (or was believed to be) in the past. It is argued that transnational activities emerge because they become sources of information and offer opportunities for political mobilization despite existing barriers (Yalcin–Heckmann ,1998). The consequences and impact of transnational activities on integration is disputed. Some argue that transnational political loyalty and political incorporation are not mutually exclusive (Oostergard–Nielsen ,2000; Fennema and Tillie 1999). Still others argue that it may inhibit integration.

Transnationalism is also disputed in the sense that some scholars like Ewa Morawska argue that it is nothing new and has always been part of migration. She argues that «life worlds and diaspora politics of turn–of–the–century immigrants share many of the supposedly novel features of present–day transnationalism» (Morawska, 2001). Still it cannot be denied that given today's opportunities there is much more room for transnationalism (for extensive discussions see Levitt 2001,

Guarnizo, 2001, Glick Schiller, 1999). In the American example, transnationalism is considered interwoven with integration and not necessarily seen as counter–effective to the logic of integration. Mexican migrants in the United States and their continued political involvement in their home country's politics is a good example for this (Jones–Correa). In our present case, the relevant realms of transnational tendencies can be seen in dual citizenship, media, political activism of migrants and low rates of intermarriage / high rates of «imported» spouses from Turkey.

Naturalization and dual citizenship of migrants

Naturalization rates of Turkish citizens reflect the diversity of host country policies. Thus, the «democratic deficit» experienced by some Turkish citizens is magnified with continuing European integration. Besides disenfranchisement, there is also the problem of protection relating to racism or plain discrimination especially if there is no legislation pertaining to these issues (e.g. Germany). According to the Center for Turkish Studies, there are 3,86 million Turks living in the EU of whom 1,3 million are EU citizens.

TABLE 5

Percentage of Turkish Population that has naturalized in the
various countries of residence (from highest to lowest)

COUNTRIES	PROPORTION OF TURKISH CITIZENS NATURALIZED
The Netherlands	64.4
Sweden	62.2
Austria	53.0
UK	47.1
France	47.0
Belgium	39.1
Germany	27.7
Denmark	26.4
Other EU countries	5.0
EU Total	34.5

Source: Eurostat, Federal Office of Statistics, Centre for Studies on Turkey

Residence requirements for naturalization for the first generation immigrants range between three and four years in Belgium and Ireland respectively and ten years in Austria, Italy and Spain. Besides proof of sufficient income and

of a clean criminal record, it is increasingly expected that the migrant knows the dominant language (all countries except Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Sweden) and the country's history or constitution (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, United Kingdom) (Bauboeck, 2006).

The principle of *ius sanguinis* is incorporated in the all modern nationality laws. Most of the EU–15 states combine this with a right to nationality derived from birth in the territory. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain the third generation (children born in the country with at least one parent also born there) acquires citizenship automatically at birth. In Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom already to the second generation benefits from this principle (with various conditions concerning the status or time of residence of parents). In Belgium acquisition by *ius soli* is not automatic, registration is required. Several states also accept *ius soli* acquisition after birth through declaration (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom) or automatically at majority (France) (Bauboeck, 2006).

Many migrants choose to maintain ties to their home country via dual citizenship. This technically can allow them to influence policy in both countries. Opponents of dual citizenship usually argue for a nation–state order, in which individuals ought to belong to one single nation–state, which is manifested in national citizenship. Just as a «single» nationality can be linked to integration, dual citizenship of migrants and transnationalism are often seen as interconnected (Bloemraad, 2003). Currently, only five countries still try to enforce renunciation of a previous nationality (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Among these, Germany and the Netherlands allow for many exceptions.

In this context, the policies of the host country are important. The Dutch naturalization process used to be one of the more open ones in Europe. The vesting period was five years, only basic language skills were required, and willingness to integrate was equated with basic language proficiency. Furthermore, since January 1992 dual citizenship was allowed. Children from immigrant descent but born in the Netherlands could acquire Dutch nationality by simple declaration when they reached the age of eighteen. Dutch nationality was granted automatically at birth if either the father or the mother was born in the Netherlands, the so–called double *ius soli* requirement. Recently, because of the growing political saliency of issues of immigration and integration in the Netherlands, the Dutch naturalization regime has become much more restrictive. Since 1997, the possibility of dual citizenship has been annulled, resulting in an immediate and steep decline in the number of applications, while participation in a so–called settlement process, consisting of language lessons and courses in Dutch history and society, has been made mandatory. In 1983, the number of naturalizations was 7,000. In 1995, the number had risen to 68,000, and in 1996 to 79,000. In comparison, in 2001 were 43,000 and in 2003, 25,000. A declining trend can also be observed specifically with Turks and their naturalization.

TABLE 6

Acquisition of Dutch Citizenship by Turkish Nationals

YEAR	TURKISH NATIONALS ACQUIRING DUTCH CITIZENSHIP
1996	30,704
1997	21,189
1998	13,484
1999	5,214
2000	4,708
2001	—
2002	5,391

Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek)

Since the reform of the citizenship law, effective as of January 1, 2000, all foreigners who have resided in Germany for at least eight years have a right to naturalization as long as they fulfill certain criteria. They will need to have a limited or unlimited residence permit or a right to residence, agree to the liberal democratic basic order of Germany, have sufficient German language skills and generally be able to financially sustain themselves. Dual or multiple–citizenship is principally to be avoided and is only accepted in certain cases. Dual citizenship is only tolerated until the child reaches adulthood, at which point he or she must choose between his or her Turkish or German passport between the ages of 18 to 23. In Germany, Turks were the largest group naturalized with 39 percent out of 140,731 in 2003. Among 1984s–2003s, a total of 623,000 Turks were naturalized.

TABLE 7

Turkish Nationals acquiring German Citizenship

YEAR	NATURALIZATIONS
1984	2.000
1985	2.000
1986	2.000
1987	2.000
1988	2.000
1989	2.000
1990	2.000
1999	104.000
2000	83.000
2001	77.000
2002	65.000
2003	56.000

Source: Federal Statistics Office Germany

Political activism of migrants

Political participation in the host country is a crucial measure of the extent of the integration of migrants. In the Netherlands, compared to other ethnic groups, Turks participate more in politics, have a greater trust in the local and governmental institutions and are more interested in local news and in local politics (Fennema and Tillie, 1999). Turks vote more often than Moroccans, while these vote more often than Surinamese and Antilleans.

Migrants have not only the right to vote in the Netherlands, also have the right to get elected. In the municipal elections in the Netherlands (March 6, 2002), 208 migrant politicians were elected into the municipal council of their municipality (out of a total of 9,080 councilors in the Netherlands). This was an increase of 38 percent compared to the 1998 elections, and more than 50 percent compared to the 1994 elections. Of these 208 city councilors more than half are of Turkish origin. In the national elections on January 22, 2003, fourteen migrant politicians (out of 150 total seats) were elected as members of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament during these elections (for further discussion see Berger and Wolff, 2001, Berger et al., 2001, Michon and Tillie, 2003)

In Germany, Turks (if they do not have citizenship) have neither active (possibility to vote) nor passive (possibility to be elected) voting rights and cannot cast ballots in local, state, federal or European elections. Therefore, they lack a stake in the exercise of state power. Hence, even though they are directly affected by political decisions, they cannot influence the shaping of these decisions, either directly or through elected representation. In the current Bundestag, among the 603 members, there are two people of Turkish descent, Ekin Deligöz, a Green Party member who received German citizenship in 1997, and Lale Akgün of the ruling Social Democrats.

One of the important discussions in Europe is around migrant organizations and the ties they have to their origin country. The transnational nature of migrant organizations elicits the fear that these ties «exhibit» or imply nationalism. There is concern that migrants will focus on homeland politics rather than orient themselves towards what is happening in their new home country. Another problematic is that ideological disputes are «imported» and the host country has continued to enjoy political influence over migrants. Examples of past «imported» controversial issues are the Kurdish question and the polarization between the extreme left and extreme right in Turkey. Examples of possible influence of the home country are officials of Diyanet that are sent by the Turkish government.

Research tells us that the differentiation of migrant organizations can be based on a number of factors. In the case of Turkish migrant organizations certain characteristics have surfaced overtime. Traditional class–based imported factions were popular in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s but in 1990s there is a ten-

dency towards local collective action associations with ethno–cultural orientations (ethno–cultural organizations increase at the expense of class ideology) (Ogelman, 2003). There is significance to the type of migrants involved (Yalcin–Heckmann, 1998). Political migrants mostly control the leadership positions in these organizations and a strong element of competition among the organizations remains (Yalcin–Heckmann, 1998). Research in the Netherlands underlines the interconnectedness of migrant organizations (through board members) and their high density (van Heelsum and Tillie, 1999). It is also pointed out that in the Netherlands, the political opportunity structure for migrant organizations emerged in the 1980s, as financial support became available and there was increased legitimacy for these organizations (Vermeulen, 2002). Continual organizational growth is observed as well (Vermeulen, 2002). In terms of development, it is claimed that many of the organizations are still at a «preliminary» stage of development and have not fully «matured» yet. Inter–generational conflict and political divisions haunt them and have led to the decline of many immigrant organizations (Yalcin–Heckmann, 1998). When it comes to policies related to the host state, a so–called «ideological convergence» is visible (Yalcin–Heckmann, 1998). This means that many of the organizations have similar attitudes towards the host country. Their influence on the host country remains limited, however (Ogelman, 2003). In countries like Germany, in particular, the difficulty for obtaining citizenship and the lack of access to policymaking through corporatist channels weakens their influence (Ogelman, Money and Martin, 2002).

There is a very high number of Turkish migrant organizations in Europe. In the Turkish community in the Netherlands, there is one organization per 291 inhabitants, in the Moroccan community one organization per 462 inhabitants and in the Surinamese Community (the biggest ethnic group) one organization per 770 inhabitants. Most of the Turkish organizations represent the divisions in the home country, while their agenda is mixed with issues concerning Turkey and the host country. Both of the host countries discourage any influence of Turkey on migrant organizations and the Turkish migrant community. The transnational links maintained via migrant organizations are considered a problematic signal whereby migrants continue to be deeply involved in the life of their countries of origin even though they no longer live there permanently.

Homeland–originated Media

In most cities of Europe where Turkish populations exist, it is possible to buy many printed publications including numerous daily newspapers. New technologies such as satellite television, cellular telephones, and the Internet further broke down state borders and provided the diaspora a stronger influence on developments «at home». In Europe for many years the availability of media from

Turkey was limited to print. In the early 1990s, the Turkish Radio and Television's international public channel began to be broadcasted via cable. Later on, private television carried by satellite became available at a reasonable cost. Turks now have instant access to news on current events in their homeland as well as to contemporary popular culture (see Project Hermes)

In Germany, nearly a million televisions are tuned into Turkish television by satellite every night (Aksoy, 2000). Sixty percent of Germany's Turks had satellite television connections in 1998 in order to receive half a dozen Turkish channels.

In 1995, a survey of Dutch migrants found that 43 percent of the Turkish respondents owned a satellite dish, 52 percent subscribed to cable and 34 percent had a master antenna (Veldkamp, 1995). In 1999, 76 percent had cable and 73 percent owned a satellite dish (Veldkamp, 1999). In the same 1999 study it was found that eight out of the eleven Turkish channels that can be received via cable or satellite in the Netherlands are watched by more than half of the Turkish respondents. This is much more than in 1995. At that time, the majority saw only four out of the available nine channels. Although some research suggests that satellite channels are far from discouraging the integration process, it is evident that the above statistics reflect high rates for watching Turkey–originated media. It is also suggested that there is a need for Turkish satellite channels as well as Dutch channels among Turkish viewers, and that the main reason for watching these channels is for stay informed about the social and political situation in Turkey (Staring and Zorlu, 1996). For Dutch news, viewers watch the Dutch news channels. It is of course possible to view the migrants as «localized cosmopolites» (Caglar, 2002) having attachments to several places in the world. It is also possible, however, to consider the influence of the media as a medium that reinforces ties to the origin country and undermines or complicates integration (Ogan, 2001).

Intermarriage and «spouse migration»

The choice of partners from the home country reinforces transnational ties and is considered a challenge for integration. The extent to which ethnic intermarriage occurs is widely accepted as an important indicator of assimilation and identification. Turks increasingly are «strategizing marriage». In other words, the large majority of Turks, including the second generation, choose a partner of the same ethnic background.

In the Netherlands, nine out of ten married persons born in Turkey or Morocco have a partner born in the same country (Harmsen, 1999). In Germany the situation is not much different. Since 1970, the numbers of German–Turkish marriages has increased although the overall numbers are very low. For example, in 2003 there were 7,414 marriages between Turks and Germans. These numbers

indicate a low level of intermarriage among Germans and Turks but many Turks have German nationality and do not appear in the statistics.

Remittances, GNP, Exports, Trade Deficit, and share of Remittances in
Trade Deficit, Exports, and GNP, 1975–2003

YEARS	REMITTANCE	GNP	EXPORTS	TRADE DEFICIT	AS A PERCENTAGE OF TRADE DEFICIT	AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS	AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP
1975	1313	47452	1401	–3338	39,3	93,7	2,77
1980	2071	63391	2910	–4999	41,4	71,2	3,27
1985	1714	66891	8255	–2975	57,6	20,8	2,56
1990	3243	150758	13626	–8955	36.2	23.8	2.15
1991	2819	150168	13672	–7326	38.5	20.6	1.88
1992	3008	158122	14891	–8191	36.7	20.2	1.90
1993	2919	178715	15610	–14162	20.6	18.7	1.63
1994	2627	132302	18390	–4216	62.3	14.3	1.99
1995	3327	170081	21975	–13212	25.2	15.1	1.96
1996	3542	183601	32446	–10582	33.5	10.9	1.93
1997	4197	192383	32647	–15358	27.3	12.9	2.18
1998	5356	206552	31220	–14220	37.7	17.2	2.59
1999	4529	185171	29325	–10443	43.4	15.4	2.45
2000	4560	201188	31375	–22337	20.4	14.5	2.27
2001	2786	149787	35000	–10000	27.9	8.0	1.86
2002	1936	179914	35753	–15750	12.2	5.4	1.07
2003	1710	239000	47068	–21740	7.9	3.6	0.7

* In million US dollars.
Sources: Gökdere (1994), State Institute of Statistics (SIS) (2003),
Central Bank of Turkey (2003), MiReKoc.

Remittances

Remittances sent back by migrants are a powerful financial force in developing countries. After foreign direct investment and trade–related earnings, remittances are the largest financial flow into developing countries, often far larger than official development assistance. Unlike development aid, remittances are spent directly

by the families of migrants, so in many respects remittances are a very efficient way to raise the incomes of people in Turkey. The Turkish government has experimented with different methods of attracting remittances. In the early 1970s, the Turkish Government established DESIYAB, the State Industrial and Workers' Investment Bank, to attract savings and remittances. It also encouraged programs for worker owned and managed cooperatives and joint public–private investment in enterprises. Joint stock companies were promoted for less developed areas with the aim to industrialize regions of origin and encourage the return of migrants. Generally, these initiatives have been considered as not very successful.

Turkey receives remittances estimated to total 2 per cent or more of its GNP. It is known that there are remittance «life cycles» and they vary across cultures, countries, and economic conditions. In the Turkish case it appears that the remittances have declined as a share of the trade deficit and the GNP but it is actually the case that income from other sources has risen. Furthermore, there is of course the difficulty of measuring remittances accurately (for a more extensive discussion see Icduygu 2006)

To what extent has Turkish emigration and the existence of a Turkish diaspora influenced economic, political and social development in Turkey?

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS OF LABOR

A large part of Turkish emigrants were relatively skilled workers who were not unemployed at the time they emigrated. Emigration reduced the pressure on unemployment in Turkey. Turkey lost skilled labor due to the emigration but research demonstrates that this had no negative effect on production. On the contrary, emigration increased production because remittances increased demand. Research also suggests that emigration had no effects on the development of wages in Turkey. It is estimated that migration from Turkey, between 1962 and 1988, exhibited a positive association among GDP per capita in the home country and rate of emigration at low income levels, but a negative association at higher income levels. Also, the export of labor accelerated the existing process of mechanization of agriculture in the village, and made more people available for emigration. As European countries stopped issuing new labor permits in the mid 1970s, emigration to Turkish cities rather than European countries began to speed up.

LINKS BETWEEN REMIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The arguments that emigrants will return with better qualifications and hence in return aid the development of the country of emigration have not been proven right. This happened partly because the majority of the emigrants have not re-

turned. Also, studies have shown that the few returning migrants often tried to establish themselves as self–employed in small businesses relating to trade and service, in which case they have no need for the qualifications learned during their work in industries in Western Europe. Nevertheless, there were many companies that were set up with capital raised among immigrants. Their success rates have been mixed at best. There were also numerous scams where immigrants were simply embezzled.

THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND TURKISH EMIGRANTS

The Turkish government over the years has adopted different incentive measures to encourage emigrants to transfer the emigrants' savings. Turkey has considered remittances an important element of employment policy because the investment of the emigrants' savings makes it possible to create new jobs in Turkey. It has sought to maximize remittances with a variety of programs and policies that ranged from allowing tariff–free imports if returning migrants converted their foreign currency savings into the Turkish lira and establishing Turkish Workers Companies to channel savings into job–creating factories in the migrants' areas of origin.

In addition to financial incentives, remittances have also been stimulated by means of other inducements. The government of Turkey has introduced a scheme under which male emigrants can drastically reduce their compulsory national service period by paying the government a certain specified amount in foreign exchange. Building a new house or repairing the existing one is an important way for migrants to use remittances

However, contrary to conventional belief it seems that the incentives to attract emigrants' remittances have not been very successful. Research (Straubhaar, 1986) demonstrates that Turkish remittances have responded to changes in government in Turkey and hence to political confidence rather than policies induce remittances through manipulation of either the exchange rate or the interest rate. Nevertheless, remittances were very important for Turkey. Especially during the 1980s, 24 per cent of Turkey's imports were covered by the cash remittances and foreign exchange deposits of Turkish workers abroad (Kumcu, 1989).

EMIGRANTS AS INVESTORS IN TURKEY

Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, it was difficult to create small businesses with foreign capital or foreign partners. During those years, Turkey had high tariffs, an overvalued exchange rate, and a preference for state–run businesses. This led to migrants returning with savings to buy land or animals if they returned to farm, or to build better houses, buy vehicles to provide taxi or transport services,

or to buy land and housing as investments. A World Bank study on the use of remittances in Turkey shows that «purchase of residential plots, house construction and house improvement are expenditures that receive priority» (Swamy, 1984). In Turkey, substantial investments in private businesses were also reported (*Ibid*). Migrants play an important role as innovating and transnational operating entrepreneurs and investors in Turkey. Especially in Germany, Turkish entrepreneurs are increasingly active in the tourism, catering and entertainment sectors in Turkey. There are also an increasing number of young often educated immigrants who return to Turkey to take up positions in the tourism industry.

THE ROLE OF GENDER IN EMIGRATION

More than 20 percent of the so–called guest workers, who were recruited, were women. Most of them came from an urban environment and were educated. It was only in the second phase of migration, which started in the early 1970s, that women from rural areas followed. Today the ratio is even between men and women.

Migration is viewed as a significant factor in determining gender roles among Turkish women. Abadan–Unat (1977) points out that employment of immigrant women leads to a noticeable decrease of extended families and a sharp rise of nuclear family role structures. Employment of women and a shift from traditional family patterns affect primarily the division of tasks concerning bread–winning, establishments of joint savings and bank accounts. However, as mentioned by Kadıoğlu (1994), working outside the house does not change their status within the family regarding responsibility in housework, cooking, cleaning and caring for children, and within the society concerning their potential as a source of defilement violating certain set of group rules, values, and loyalties. According to Kadıoğlu (1994), migrating women exercised more independent behavior but retained traditional responsibility for housework. The greatest differences were between women with wage work and women without or with migrating husbands. Followers without wage work were the most disadvantaged.

It can be argued that some Turkish women gain an improved quality of life through their migration. Women, with their own jobs and earnings, are often in more powerful positions. Their entry into the labor force provides them with opportunities that would have been inconceivable in the communities of origin.

Women left behind in Turkey had to assume greater economic roles since their men were away. However, «emigration as a component of modernization is exercising a double function: promoting emancipation of women as well as creating a false climate of liberation, which actually does not surpass increased purchasing power, thus resulting only in pseudo emancipation» (Abadan Unat, 1977: 55).

In a study comparing attitudes toward the status of women in Turkey,

Day and Içduygu,(1997: p.343), find that «Returned migrants tend to be concentrated at the more «progressive», less «traditional» end of the spectrum». Close kin and friends of migrants were ranked next most progressive and «all others» in the control group ranked most traditional. However, also argue that these differences more closely reflect selectivity in recruitment for work abroad than any socialization effects from the migration experience.

Family formation and reunification has also played an important role over the last two decades in shaping the place female immigrants in society. Young immigrants and their families have preferred to «import» brides and grooms from «home». This has usually led imported «brides» being trapped in the home unable to integrate or participate into their host societies often aggravating the general problem of integration that immigrants have faced. On the other hand break down of marriages and high levels of divorce have been recorded between immigrant brides and imported «grooms». (Timmerman, 2006)

INTERACTIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL
IN THE SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRY

There is a great concern in some receiving countries such as Germany about the voting behavior of the (naturalized) Turkish community during German elections. The fear is about the Turkish migrants being influenced or even manipulated by the Turkish government to vote (en bloc) for a certain German political party. The vote of emigrant Turks so far has not been a major issue in Turkish elections yet. Turkey allows its nationals abroad to remain on the electoral register but requires that they return to Turkey to cast a ballot on Election Day. There are practical difficulties of organizing the voting of Turkish emigrants, especially in large countries like Germany. There are too many voters spread out all over the country and it is difficult to organize a ballot on a single day. Furthermore, there are too few Turkish consulates to handle the numbers. The Turkish Supreme Election Board has rejected the option of postal voting and requires ballots to be cast in person. The Board has also dismissed using different systems in different foreign countries.

There is political intertwining among migrant organizations and Turkish politics. For example, there are close ties between the organization Milli Görüş Europe and Turkey. Milli Görüş members have run for political office in Turkey and members of the movement in Turkey have joined the ranks within Milli Görüş, especially in Germany. Necmettin Erbakan, who is considered the ideologue of the Milli Görüş movement had frequently visited the European branches and is in particular supported by the Southern branch of the organization. It is known that the European wing of the organization has provided funds and massive moral support for Erbakan over the years. Close links continue to be maintained between Milli Görüş and the current political part, Justice and De-

velopment Party, in power. However, interestingly Tayyip Erdoğan, the current prime minister in contrast to Erbakan, seems much more forthcoming in encouraging immigrants to take up local citizenship integrate into especially the political life of host societies. However, maintaining cultural identity continues to be stressed. In contrast to the past this government pays much more attention to the problems of immigrants communities in general. The prime minister and other ministers, such as the state minister responsible for immigrants, frequently visit these communities and address them.

Turkish immigrants have had a long standing reputation for a lively associational life. However, for a long time this life reflected political divisions in Turkey along the ethnic, religious, cultural and ideological fault lines. This was particularly manifested in the case of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Organizations closely associated with Kurdistan People's Party (PKK) were very active among Kurdish immigrants from Turkey. Their activities and use of violence often strained relations between Turkey and host countries. However, such problems were not limited to Kurdish organizations. There were organizations ranging from groups that advocated the establishment of a «Caliphate» in Turkey based on the Shari'a law to Marxist–Leninist groups advocating revolution there. However, during the course of the last decade Turkish immigrant associations interested in «local» politics and aiming to assist and facilitate the integration of Turkish immigrants into their host societies have emerged. A case in point is the Türkischer Bund Berlin Brandeburg (TBB). In contrast to the Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, much more closely associated with Milli Görüş, TBB has tried to become a mainstream German organization. Again over the last decade our so main–stream Turkish professional organizations have also emerged such as organizations representing Turkish academics, doctors etc... Turkish immigrants have also become involved in local, national and European level politics and joined political parties from both Christian Democrat as well as Social Democrat background. Many of these politicians are actively involved in Turkey's EU membership bid. The Turkish state too has tried to shape associational live. The best example of this is the Turkish Islamic Union that is under the close supervision of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Turkish government.

TURKISH STATE INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND
CITIZENSHIP POLICIES

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides basic consular services for these immigrants ranging from issuing passports to the registration of marriages, births etc... Consulates also take in applications for dual–citizenship even if the ultimate authorization has to come from the Interior Ministry. The Directorate General of External Relations and Services for Workers Abroad of the Ministry of

Labour and Social Security is responsible for addressing the labor and social welfare problems of Turkish citizens abroad. It appoints labor attachés to major capitals of EU countries to oversee the Ministry's tasks. The Directorate prepares a yearly report detailing the Ministry's activities and services destined for Turkish immigrants as well as offer a set of demographic, economic and social statistics about them. The report also provides coverage of jurisprudence from national courts and European Court of Justice concerning cases involving Turkish immigrants' labor and social rights as well as recent national legislative developments concerning Turkish immigrants. Traditionally, the Ministry operated on the basis of the understanding that Turkish immigrants would one day be returning to Turkey. The Ministry of Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs are two public institutions with programs for Turkish immigrants. Both institutions on the basis of bi–lateral agreements send school teachers and religious officials to serve Turkish immigrant communities.

Over the last few years all these Ministries have become increasingly conscious of the fact that Turkish immigrants are there to stay in their host countries. These developments have created a climate relatively more receptive to projects aiming to assist Turkish immigrants with integration problems.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly recently has become interested in the problems of Turkish nationals living abroad. The election of members of the parliament with immigrant background or experience has played an important role in this. The Parliament constituted a commission in April 2003 to visit immigrant communities in Europe and investigate their problems. The Commission adopted an extensive report analyzing a wide range of problems experienced by Turkish immigrants and submitted their recommendation in December 2003 (TGNA, 2004).

The realization that Turkish immigrants were not temporary guests culminated in amendments to the citizenship law in Turkey. The 1964 law that regulated the acquisition and loss of Turkish citizenship did not allow for dual citizenship (Law No. 403). The growing demands of immigrants concerning problems associated with military service, property ownership and political rights culminated in a decision to amend this law. Politicians desire to respond to these demands were also supplemented by the growing recognition that immigrants living in Europe could constitute a lobbying potential for the Turkish state. The first amendment to the law took place in 1981 (Law No.2383). On the condition that permission was sought from Turkish authorities the acquisition of a second nationality was legalized. Furthermore, the amendment also made it possible for an individual to loose Turkish citizenship temporarily and subsequently to reclaim it to enable the individual to acquire a new nationality that did not allow dual nationality. However, this arrangement continued to cause Turkish immigrants in Germany problems especially after German government's threat to pursue immigrants who reacquire a second citizenship. Furthermore, this problem was also coupled with the increased racist attacks on Turkish im-

migrants in Germany. A growing number of Turkish politicians believed that acquisition of German nationality would be one way of encountering these attacks but also would help the Turkish community to express and defend their interest better. Hence, the Nationality Law was once more amended in 1995 (Law No. 4112). The amendment introduced came to be known as the «pink card» and gave the holders a sort of privileged non–citizen status. This status enabled holders of a «pink card» to reside, to acquire property, to be eligible for inheritance, to operate businesses and to work in Turkey like any citizen of Turkey. They could practically enjoy all the rights of regular citizens except enjoy the right to vote in local and national elections.

II. IMMIGRATION INTO TURKEY

Historical background and policy

Traditionally, as Castles and Miller notes, Turkey's immigration policy resembled very much the policies of Germany and Israel (Castles and Miller, 2003). Ethnic and cultural ties have determined the basis of Turkey's immigration policies. Migration into Turkey was typically composed of people from primarily Balkan countries and was governed by legislation and practices that very much reflected the nation–state building concerns of the «founding fathers» of the Turkish Republic. Exclusive priority was given to encouraging and accepting immigrants that were either Muslim Turkish speakers or were considered by the officials to be people belonging to ethnic groups that would easily melt into a Turkish identity (Cağaptay, 2005 and Kirişci, 2000). This is very much a reflection of the way the definition of Turkish national identity evolved and the manner in which this influenced or was reflected in Turkey's immigration policy.

The founding fathers of the Turkish Republic had envisaged a typically civic definition of citizenship and national identity. This was reflected in a conspicuous manner in the 1924 Constitution of Turkey. According to Article 88 of this constitution, all citizens of Turkey irrespective of their religious or ethnic affiliations were defined as «Turks». However, the practice especially from late 1920s onwards developed very differently. Concerns about the territorial and political unity of the country in the face of Kurdish rebellions and Islamic fundamentalist uprisings against secularism played an important role in deviating from this civic understanding of national identity to one that emphasized homogeneity and «Turkishness». The identifying feature of «Turkishness» was not solely Turkish ethnicity but the ability and willingness to adopt the Turkish language and to be members of Muslim Sunni ethnic groups closely associated with past Ottoman rule. Hence, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, Tatars etc… were very much included into this definition while Gagauz Turks, who are Christian, and

members of other Christian minorities, Alevis and unassimilated Kurds where excluded. Initially, Albanians were also excluded on the grounds that they had too strong of a sense of nationhood. However, subsequently many did immigrate to Turkey and assimilated into «Turkishness». Furthermore, the international context of the time, which put heavy emphasis practically all across Europe on national homogeneity and unity, did influence the Turkish elite too.

This definition of national identity was not only deeply reflected in Turkey's immigration policy but also its settlement and employment legislation. The major piece of legislation governing immigration into Turkey is The Law on Settlement (No. 2510) of 1934. In a most conspicuous manner the Law limits the right to immigrate to Turkey only to people of «Turkish descent and culture». Similarly, Turkish law from the same era had traditionally severely restricted employment opportunities for non–nationals while positively discriminating in favor of non–nationals of «Turkish descent and culture». The Law on the Specific Employment Conditions of Turkish Citizens in Turkey (No. 2007) of 1932 reserved certain jobs and professions only to Turkish citizens. Furthermore, the practice that developed in the 1930s and 1940s was one that would deny some of these professions to Turkish citizens belonging to non–Muslim minorities not to mention public sector professions such as employment with the security forces and the judiciary (Aktar, 2001 and Cağaptay, 2005). This practice of giving priority and privileges to people considered to be of «Turkish» ethnicity survived well into recent times. As late as in 1981 the then military government introduced a law (No. 2527) enabling foreigners of Turkish descent facilitated access to employment in Turkey including in the public sector usually reserved to Turkish citizens. Law 2007 from 1932 was rescinded only when the new Law on Work Permits for Foreigners (No. 4817) was adopted in March 2003.

MIGRATION FLOWS INTO TURKEY

Immigration of migrants of «Turkish» descent

As the figures from Table 9 show more than 1,6 million immigrants settled in Turkey between the establishment of the Republic and the mid–1990s. The state actively encouraged immigration into Turkey and provided resources until the early 1970s. It maintained a whole bureaucracy responsible for their settlement and their integration into Turkish society. The overwhelming majority of the immigrants came from Balkan countries accompanied by small number of immigrants originally fleeing Sinkiang, a western province of China, after the arrival to power Mao Tchetung in 1949. For all intend and purposes this kind of «traditional» immigration into Turkey has stopped. After the collapse of communism in the Balkan countries the Turkish government has been encouraging Turkish

speaking communities closely associated with Turkey to stay at home. The possibility of freer movement across frontiers and expansion of business as well as cultural relations between Turkey and the Balkan region has also significantly lessened the pressure for these communities to immigrate to Turkey.

TABLE 9

Number of people who migrated to Turkey;
by region between 1923–1997

COUNTRY	1923–1939	1940–1945	1946–1997	TOTAL
Bulgaria	198,688	15,744	603,726	
Greece	384,000	–	25,889	
Romania	117,095	4,201	1,266	
Yugoslavia	115,427	1,671	188,600	
Turkistan	–	–	2,878	
Others	7,998	1,005	8,631	
TOTAL	823,208	22,621	830,990	1,676,819

Refugee Movements

Immigration also included refugee movements into Turkey. The onset of the Nazi regime in Germany in 1933 led to some German speaking refugees that sought asylum in Turkey. These refugees included university professors, scientists, artists and philosophers. This enabled them to leave a major imprint on Turkish art and sciences, universities as well as the society at large. These professors played a central role in the reorganization of the Turkish university system. However, interestingly they were not admitted to Turkey on the basis of any legal arrangement but as a result of a deal that was brokered with the encouragement of Kemal Atatürk. A large number of these intellectuals were Jewish. However, Turkey's policy toward Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany was a mixed one. On the one hand Turkey is reported to have allowed Jews from German occupied Europe to transit to Palestine.[2] Yet, on the other hand Turkey did not prevent human tragedies occurring. Turkish authorities would not allow a number of ships carrying Jewish refugees to Palestine to stop and berth in Turkish ports. This practice led to the *Struma* incident in February 1942. The *Struma*

---

[2] Shaw (1991, 256) puts the number at around one hundred thousand. However, Bali, (2004, 171, footnote 18) disagrees and argues that the numbers were more like 15 to 17,000.

had arrived in Istanbul in December 1941 after having broken down in the Black Sea. When a solution to the problems faced by the ship and its passengers could not be found it was towed back to the Black Sea and left a drift. Subsequently, the ship was torpedoed most probably by a Soviet submarine, causing the death of all on board (Bali, 1999). During the course of the Second World War many people from German occupied Balkans also sought refuge in Turkey. These included Bulgarians, Greeks especially from Greek islands on the Aegean as well as Italians from the Dodecanese islands. There are no public records available for their number but at least according to one source there were approximately 67,000 internees and refugees in Turkey at the end of the Second World War (Vernant, 1953). However, the majority of these people returned to their countries subsequent to the end of the war except those who fulfilled the conditions set by the Settlement Law.

Even though Turkey's refugee policy significantly changed after the Second World War, it nevertheless remained a function of the state policy not to accept immigrants who were not of «Turkish descent or culture». In this period the Cold War became a determining factor of Turkish policy. Turkey with the Cold War had become firmly embedded in the Western Bloc. Hence, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of the refugees came from the Soviet Bloc. In close cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Turkey received refugees from the Communist Bloc countries in Europe, including the Soviet Union. Such refugees, during their stay in Turkey, enjoyed all the rights provided for in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, only a very small number were allowed to stay on in Turkey, often as a result of marriages with Turkish nationals. The others were resettled out of Turkey.

Turkey also experienced mass influxes of refugees in 1952, 1988, 1989 and 1991. The influxes in 1952 and 1989 involved Turks and Pomaks from Bulgaria. They were basically permitted to stay and settle in Turkey. On both occasions the government adopted special policies to facilitate their integration into mainstream Turkish society. In contrast the 1988 and 1991 ones involved primarily Kurdish refugees. In this case Turkish policy was characterized by a preference for repatriation and/or resettlement. The two mass influxes were very much seen as potential threats to national security. In the latter case Turkey embarked on an energetic effort to convince the international community to create a «safe haven» in northern Iraq to ensure the speedy return of the refugees. In the case of the estimated 20–25,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees that came to Turkey between 1992 and 1995, a generous «temporary asylum» policy was introduced that gave these refugees access to education, employment and health possibilities falling just short of proper integration. An overwhelming majority of these refugees subsequently returned home. A similar policy was also adopted for the approximately 17,000 Kosovar refugees from the crisis in 1999.

TABLE 10

Applications under the 1994 Asylum Regulation, 1995–December 2006

COUNTRY	APPLICATIONS	ACCEPTED CASES	REJECTED CASES	PENDING CASES
Iraq	14,619	4,784	5,054	4,054
Iran	27,194	16,871	2,063	7,176
Afghanistan	938	284	275	370
Russia	77	15	38	18
Uzbekistan	187	69	70	38
Azerbaijan	36	3	24	1
Other Europe*	117	51	54	3
Other**	1,226	213	304	660
Total***	44,394	22,290	7,882	12,320

* Includes Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germeny, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.
** Includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Birmania (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi, China, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Moritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, Yemen, Zaire. *** Not appearing in the table but included in the total are 1,710 applications that were subsequently withdrawn.
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 07.12.2006

The state's preferred national identity definition is also reflected in respect to asylum policies. According to the Settlement Law only asylum seekers of «Turkish descent and culture» can acquire a full–fledged refugee status with the ultimate possibility of settling in Turkey. This is also reflected in the manner in which Turkey has adhered to the central international legal instrument on refugees, the 1951 Geneva Convention. Turkey was among a group of countries who took an active role in the production of a definition of «refugee» and was among those countries who pushed for the introduction of a geographical and time limitation to the Convention as expressed in Article 1.B (1)(a). Accordingly,

Turkey accepted to be bound by the terms of the Convention for refugees flee-ing persecution only in Europe as a result of events prior to 1951. In 1967, when signing the 1967 Additional Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Turkey accepted to lift the time but chose to continue to maintain the «geographical limitation». This in practice has meant that Turkey is under no legal obligation to grant refugee status to asylum seekers coming from outside of Europe. Although, it did allow the UNHCR to receive asylum applications from such persons as long as these persons were resettled out of Turkey if recognized as refugees. In this way a form of temporary asylum was granted.

TABLE 11

Resettlement out of Turkey;

by country of origin and country of settlement since 1995

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	COUNTRY OF SETTLEMENT						
	CANADA	USA	OCEANIA	OTHER EUROPE	SCANDINAVIA	OTHERS	TOTAL
Afghanistan	71	89	3	17	79	–	259
Iran	3,910	6,895	2,414	221	3,295	11	16,746
Iraq	865	630	1,036	664	1,478	33	4,706
Africa	64	66	–	4	9	–	143
North Africa	3	–	–	–	1	–	4
Asia	55	26	1	–	7	–	89
Middle East	16	–	5	7	6	1	35
Bosnia Herzegovina	–	45	–	1	–	–	46
Others*	9	–	–	–	–	–	9
TOTAL	4,993	7,751	3,459	914	4,875	45	22,037

Africa: Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan.
North Africa: Morocco, Libya, Tunisia. Asia: Burma, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan.
Middle East: Palestine, Syria, Egypt. Others*: Burundi, Kyrgyzstan, Jordan, Yemen.
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand. Other Europe: Austria, Britain, Belgium, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland,
Ukraine, Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden.
Others: Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Dubai, Indonesia, Israel,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI.
Data current as of 07.12.2006.

The regime change in Iran and instability in the Middle East as well as Africa and Southeast Asia led to an increase in the number of asylum seekers in Turkey starting from the early 1980s. For along time the government allowed the UNHCR considerable leeway as long as these asylum seekers would be recognized and resettled out of Turkey. However, the growth in the number of illegal entries into Turkey and in the number of rejected asylum seekers stranded in Turkey led the government to tighten its policy. Tough new regulations to govern asylum in 1994 was introduced. This led to an increase in the number of deportations and attracted criticism from refugee advocacy and human rights circles. Subsequently, the UNHCR in close cooperation with Turkey succeeded in developing a new system of asylum that today handles approximately 4,000 to 4,500 asylum applications a year. Government officials expect that those who are not recognized as refugees leave the country and those that are recognized are resettled out of Turkey. As can be seen from Table 10 the majority of the asylum seekers come from neighboring Iran and Iraq with smaller numbers coming from more distant countries. The refugee recognition rate compared to the ones in Europe is very high. However, the overwhelming majority of recognized refugees are exclusively resettled to third countries by the UNHCR (see Table 11). This is a practice that is under pressure and is expected to be fundamentally revised in the context of Turkish accession to the European Union. This is issue will be studied in greater detail in section III of this paper.

Transit Irregular Migration

There is also a form of transit irregular migration involving nationals of neighboring countries such as Iraq and Iran as well as nationals from more distant countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan etc… These are people that often resort to the services of human smugglers and pay large fees to get themselves smuggled into western European countries. In the case of Turkey they are more likely to enter Turkey through its Eastern borders, travel through Turkey and try to enter Greece illegally across the land border and the Aegean Sea. There are also occasionally boats that try to smuggle people directly on to Italy and France. These boats carrying illegal migrants occasionally sink leading to human tragedies. It is very difficult to estimate the numbers of such irregular transit migrants in Turkey and figures that are cited are in variably speculative ones. However, according to government statistics there were more than 622,000 such persons apprehended between 1995 and 2006 (November) (see Table 12). Nevertheless, these numbers also include nationals of mostly former Soviet Union countries who have violated their terms of stay in Turkey. Most of these persons have no intention of moving on to Europe. It is mostly the nationals of Middle East and Asian countries that try to use Turkey as a transit country.

TABLE 12

Breakdown by nationality of illegal immigrants arrested by
Turkish security forces, 1995–November 2006

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF PEOPLE
Afghanistan	37,194
Bangladesh	19,227
Pakistan	50,401
Iran	25,030
Iraq	113,309
Syria	7,885
Sub–total	253,046
North Africa*	11,964
Former Soviet Republics**	125,889
Central Asian Countries***	11,157
Albania	4,477
Bulgaria	10,165
Romania	22,348
Turkey	30,526
EU	20,817
Others	132,222
TOTAL	622,611

* Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morrocco, and Tunisia.
** Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. *** Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan. *Source*: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of
the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (MOI)
Data current as of 01.11.2006.

Human Trafficking

To these groups one must also add trafficked persons, particularly women. These
are persons that have either been coerced or deceived into traveling to Turkey for
purposes of prostitution and remain in Turkey against their wish. This problem
is attracting growing government and civil society attention. Numerous interna-
tional institutions such as International Organization for Migration and the US
Department of State have been monitoring the situation in Turkey. The Police

have developed close cooperation with civil society and has put into place a system that has considerably improved the situation in respect to combating trafficking and extending protection and assistance to the victims of trafficking. In 2005 an emergency «Alo 157» telephone helpline has been instituted and already a large number of victims have benefited from this line.

EU migration and others

There are also individuals from neighboring countries that take up jobs illegally. The case of Gagauz Turks from Moldavia is particularly interesting because back in the 1930s they were denied the possibility to immigrate to Turkey. Today many Moldavian women are actually working in middle–class homes in Istanbul and other cities. The Turkish state partly in attempt to regularize their status and partly in the context of EU reforms adopted new legislation that does allow such people to obtain proper work and residence permits. However, many continue to prefer to work illegally. There are also a growing number of students coming from various countries and especially from the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. Furthermore, there are also an increasing number of European Union member state nationals and spouses engaged in professional activities settling in Turkey particularly in Istanbul as well as retirees in some of the Mediterranean resorts. This too constitutes a relatively new phenomenon in terms of immigration into Turkey and their numbers are estimated to be around 100,000 to 120,000 (Kaiser, 2003).

One striking manifestation how growing immigration is affecting Turkish society is that Turkish society is becoming accustomed to live with foreigners as well as Turks that would not easily fit into the traditional narrow definition of a «Turk». Sports are an area where this manifests itself most conspicuously. Currently, in Turkey there are a large number of foreigners are active and visible in various branches. Among them there are Turks clearly of foreign descent. Turkish society is becoming accustomed to seeing names in Turkish national teams that are not immediately classic Turkish names. The most prominent of such names is naturally Elvan Abeylegesse. She was the world record holder of 5000 meters and represented Turkey at the Olympic Games in Athens. She is from Ethiopian origin and after she broke the world record there was actually a debate in the media about her «Turkishness». Interestingly, many commentators and members of the public stood by her «Turkishness» against those who argued she was not a real «Turk». When during the Olympics she did not perform as well as she was expected the public expressed an outpour of support for her. Similarly, the public has become very much at ease with the Turkish national volleyball team that ran a very successful European championship competition in 2004 included a Russian, Nathalie Hanikoğlu. The national Olympic Team in 2000 and in 2004

included a number of athletes with names that traditionally would not easily be associated with «Turkishness».

The immigration and integration of Turks in Europe

A discussion of immigration from and into Turkey would be incomplete without a discussion of Turkey's ongoing EU candidacy and the consequences thereof. Turkey is currently a candidate for EU membership and has begun negotiating the terms of membership with the EU. However, Turkey's candidacy is faced with numerous challenges related to immigration. First and foremost, there is the issue of whether (substantial numbers of) Turks will migrate to the EU or not. Opponents of Turkish membership allege that, as membership will allow Turkish nationals to enjoy the right to «free movement of labor and persons» millions of Turks will actually migrate to EU countries in search of jobs. They argue that this will increase unemployment in Europe and worsen the cultural clash between Turks and local Europeans. They attribute the integration problems that many Turkish immigrants experience to fundamental cultural and religious differences. These differences are then employed to reinforce their broader argument that Turkey basically is not «European» and should not become a member of the European Union. Instead, they have argued that Turkey should be extended an undefined «privileged relationship» with the European Union. These have been powerful arguments that have resonated with the public opinion in Europe. Yet, whatever happens to EU–Turkish relations it is quite likely that Turkish emigration to Europe and elsewhere will continue. Some of that emigration will be more of the same especially through the family reunification channel. However, it is also likely that there will be a growing number of professionals who will move abroad for short or long term purposes. There are also European politicians and EU officials who recognize that European demographics is pointing at falling populations in most EU member countries and that Europe will indeed need especially educated Turkish immigrants to sustain especially their retirement schemes. Olli Rehn, the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement, in this respect argued at a conference at the LSE that «most probably a portion of his pension after his retirement would be paid for by dynamic Turkish engineers and professionals».[3]

   The Commissioner was referring to how in the face of an aging European population Turkish demographics may actually become an advantage. The concern

---

[3] Reported in *Radikal*, 22. January 2006.

in Europe is that as the population ages there will not be enough people around not only to keep an economy going but also to sustain existing social security and retirement schemes. It is estimated that by the year 2050 the total labor force of Europe will be less than what it was in 1950 (Punch and Pierce, 2000). This will be occurring during a period when Turkish population will continue to grow even if at a steadily falling rate reaching its peak at just under 100 million in 2050. In this population the percentage of people between 15 and 64 will rise to 66.9 % by 2030 and slowly fall to 63.6 % by the year 2050. The period until then is considered by demographers as a «window of opportunity» in terms of growth in economic activity (Behar, 2006). This has led to some advocate the idea of a «**complementa-rity**» between an aging population in Europe and Turkish demographics.

However, this idea needs to be taken with some caution. First of all the «demographic gap» in Europe would demand very large number of immigrants to fill it and furthermore the immigrants themselves would be aging too. Secondly, immigration as a solution to filling this «gap» would politically be very difficult to manage if not be impossible to advocate let alone implement given anti–immigrant feelings in Europe. This would actually be aggravated by the very fact that in the European public opinion there is considerable resistance to Turkish membership and to Turks in general. Thirdly, in terms of Turkish demographics it should be born out that Turkish population will it be gradually aging from 2025 and a smaller and smaller percentage of the population will be new entrants into the labor force. Hence, the pool of potential candidates for immigration will possibly be smaller (Behar, 2006).

An econometric study estimating different possible scenarios of immigration from Turkey to EU member countries between 2004 and 2030 interestingly suggests that less Turks are likely to immigrate if Turkey becomes a member than if Turkey is left out of the EU (Erzan et al, 2006). In any event the forecast is such that even the scenario that expects high levels of immigration falls well short of supporting the «complementarity» argument. The scenario that is based on the assumption that past trends of Turkish immigration will continue and that Turkish membership will occur and will be accompanied by unhindered freedom of movement with accession in 2015 forecasts that 2.1 million Turks will have migrated by the year 2030. In the opposite scenario which assumes no membership hence no free movement of labor and also a slow down in the Turkish economy the numbers would be 2.7 million. These two figures in themselves are much lower than some of the exaggerated figures that appear in the European media. They also fall well within the possible figures cited by the 2004 «impact report» of the European Commission. The figures provided by the Commission ranged between half and 4.4 million until 2030 assuming a transition period of a dozen years before free movement of labor is fully implemented.

Nevertheless, the fear of large Turkish immigration deeply affects attitudes toward Turkish EU membership. According to the Eurobarometer's December

2005, survey results, less than one third of the people surveyed in the EU–15 support Turkish membership.[4] The level of support is particularly low in the very countries where there are large Turkish immigrant communities. Public attitudes toward Turkish membership are deeply influenced by how host societies perceive Turkish immigrant communities. The fear of immigration clearly becomes embroiled with attitudes toward Turkish membership. This situation has been reflected in the wording of the Accession Negotiation Framework, this document constitutes the blue–print for the accession talks between Turkey and the EU, adopted for Turkey in October 2005 by the EU.[5] The document opens the way for member states to introduce «long transitional periods» and even «permanent safeguard clauses» to freedom of movement of persons from Turkey at membership. (Article 12) More importantly, the document notes that the «negotiations are an open–ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand». It is generally recognized that these references were introduced into this document to appease member states facing public opinion opposition to Turkish membership. In the EU there is also a large group of politicians and government officials who have been advocating the idea of a «privileged partnership» with Turkey in place of membership. This idea too is at least partly developed as a reaction to this fear of Turkish immigration.

Hence the relationship between Turkish immigration and European demographic trends is a very complicated one. The attitudes toward Turkish membership in the EU and the wording of the Negotiation Framework suggest that if Turkish demographic trends are indeed going to be an advantage, future Turkish immigration is going to have to be carefully managed. In this respect addressing the issue of how to better incorporate current Turkish immigrant stocks into their host societies is going to become very important. In a number of European countries and especially in Germany, for a long time there was a reluctance to accept immigration for what it is: immigration. Instead, a constant assumption that the migrants were «guest workers» who would one day return home prevailed. It is only over the last decade or so that serious thought had begun to be given to the «integration» of the «guest workers» of yesterday and «immigrants» of today. On the other hand, those countries whose political systems were more realistic about what they were facing, such as the Netherlands, Belgium (partly), France, Denmark and Sweden, introduced diverse policies to manage the integration of

---

[4] EUROBAROMETER 64, Public Opinion in the European Union, OPINION IN First Results, December 2005, page 29–32, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdf. Turkey is at the bottom of the list with 31 percent below Albania with 33 % and Serbian and Montenegro 39 %. Highest level of support was for Switzerland and Norway with 77 %.

[5] This document can be accessed from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/negotiating_framework_turkey.pdf

immigrants. France is a special case in the sense that it aimed, at least theoretically, to assimilate immigrants, while the others adopted various shades of multi–cultural approaches. What is striking is that whatever the approach, whether be it the French assimilationist, the German exclusionary, the Dutch multi–cultural or the Scandinavian welfare–paternalistic approaches, they all seem to now encounter the problems associated with weak integration on the part of immigrants in respect to employment, education, political participation and social integration. Combined with public opinion that is increasingly unfavorable towards immigration, this has «forced» European politicians to more and more move towards restrictive integration policies. At the same time this experience has a considerable impact on Europe's perception of Turkey's potential EU membership.

Turkey itself, too, for a long time considered Turkish immigrants in Europe as «guest workers» and expected that they would one day return. Turkish policies towards them were very much determined by these considerations. It is only recently that it has been recognized that many are there to stay. In the meantime however the EU engagement of Turkey has indeed brought about some changes in the government's attitude towards the problems of Turkish immigrant communities. The current government in Turkey has on a number of occasions highlighted the importance of the integration of Turkish immigrants in Europe. The Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, during a visit to Germany, underlined the importance of taking up local citizenship, learning the local language and participating in local politics. He argued that it is possible to integrate into host societies without compromising one's cultural identity.[6] Similarly, in a very eloquent speech the Minister of State responsible for religious affairs and Turks living abroad, Mehmet Aydın, too stressed the importance of integration of Turks into their respective host societies and stressed that in a multi–cultural framework this was perfectly possible.[7] In an unprecedented manner the Turkish Parliament adopted in December 2003 an extensive report investigating the problems of Turkish nationals living abroad. The report emphasized the importance of language skills and education. It elaborated on a list of recommendations to encourage and facilitate the integration of Turkish nationals into their host societies (TGNA, 2003).

Another aspect of EU–Turkish relations is that the nature and composition of the Turkish immigrant stock in Europe is likely to change with EU membership. This could have important consequences in terms of both the challenge of integrating the existing stock but also in terms of ameliorating the negative public opinion in Europe towards Turkish membership. Over the last couple of years Turkey has profoundly been transformed. Pre–accession will most prob-

---

[6] The Prime Minister's remarks were reported in *Radikal,* November 8 and 9, 2005.
[7] Speech delivered by Mehmet Aydın on December 9, 2005 at the *International Migration Symposium,* December 8–11, 2005, Istanbul.

ably accelerate this transformation, which will have a number of important consequences in terms of immigration and integration issues. Firstly, the developments in Turkish economy and politics will have an impact on Turks' decision to migrate or not. This will also influence the composition of immigrants that may move from Turkey to EU countries. The existing patterns of immigration characterized by family reunification and family formation, driven by the current Turkish immigrant stock in Europe, will be accompanied by a movement of labor and persons that is more likely to be educated and more professional. This will inevitably generate new social and political dynamics within the Turkish community in Europe but also between the latter and host societies. The patterns of education, socialization and participation in the politics of host societies are likely to change. This in turn will transform the social and political environment surrounding the issue of the integration of the existing stock as well as improve host–society perceptions of Turkish immigrants and of Turkey.

Secondly, a Turkey that is becoming increasingly integrated in the European Union will less and less appear as the «other» in Europe. An important aspect of the integration problem of Turkish immigrants, closely associated with a sense of being treated differently and of alienation from mainstream society, would be solved through the process of becoming part of the host society. Turkish accession to the EU is likely to have a positive effect on the integration of Turkish immigrants into their host societies. Turkish accession is going to be a process that is going to challenge established patterns of thinking about Turkey and Turks as the «other». Slowly and surely many among those in Europe that have regarded Turkey culturally, socially and politically different will revise their perceptions, prejudices and images of Turkey and Turks. This in turn is likely to help to alleviate some of the alienation that Turkish immigrants experience. As a more balanced and less hostile environment emerges, the so called «ghetto effect» on the immigrants is likely to diminish. A Turkish immigrant observing this change and the gradual integration of Turkey itself into Europe will be more forthcoming in terms of integration. The two processes are likely to feed on each other and transform gradually the current vicious circle of mutual alienation to a virtuous circle of mutual integration. Even if these processes may not be all encompassing, a good portion of the host society and the immigrant community would be absorbed in it.

Thirdly, it is also likely that if EU–Turkish relations progress smoothly, Turks will increasingly be seen as partners for addressing the challenges associated with demographic decline. This sense of partnership should also help initiate the prospects of greater contacts between European and Turkish civil society. Civil society in Turkey, partly as a function of EU involvement, has grown and become more effective over the last couple of years. «Honor killings», arranged marriages, domestic violence against women and especially the education of young girls are endemic problems in certain parts of Turkey. These problems

overlap one to one with those among Turkish immigrant communities in Europe. Non–governmental organizations such as Women for Women's Human Rights, Women's Center, Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation, Association for the Promotion of Contemporary Life, have been very active and very visible in addressing these problems. They have also organized themselves into a «Women's Platform» and successfully lobbied the government to incorporate terms favorable to the protection of women's rights into legislation adopted as part of Turkey's reform process (Arat, forthcoming). These organizations have also worked closely with a governmental body called Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women. Hence, they are organizations with ample experience in lobbying, in coordinating campaigns and cooperating over field projects. This experience could be channeled to address the problems of Turkish immigrants in Europe. Cooperation between Turkish civil society and their counterparts in Europe as well as in Turkish immigrant communities could generate synergies with wide spread consequences.

This is also important in the context of the place and status of women in the Turkish immigrant communities. Gender relations within the Turkish immigrant community deeply impact on host society perceptions of Turkey as well as of Turkish immigrants. The relationship between integration and gender is multifaceted. The isolation of women from the rest of the society, especially among conservative Turkish immigrants, and the issue of arranged marriages, has serious consequences for integration. This manifests itself particularly through the impact it has on education and socialization of immigrant children. Furthermore, it provokes negative public perceptions of the Turkish immigrants themselves, further aggravating the problem of integration by complicating the relationship between the immigrants and the rest of society.

Turkey's asylum system

Turkish immigration and the incorporation of Turkish immigrants are not the only issues on the agenda of EU–Turkish relations. In its most recent Accession Partnership document of January 2006, the EU make it quite clear that it expects Turkey to replace its current asylum system with one that incorporates the current EU *acquis* in this area.[8] This will require the lifting of the «geographical limitation» with which Turkey had accepted the 1952 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This means that Turkey will have to develop and put into place a full–fledged status determination procedures and institutional infra-

---

[8] *Turkey: 2006 Accession Partnership online: http://www.euturkey.org.tr/abportal/uploads/files/APD2006.pdf.*

structure to implement the EU *acquis*. Considerable distance has been covered in this respect and both the Action Plan on Asylum and Immigration as well as the NPAA commits Turkey to lifting the «geographical limitation» by roughly accession time if certain conditions are met and to putting into place a fully fledged national status determination system.[9] Turkish officials are very much aware that the current EU *acquis* would make Turkey a major «first country of asylum» and responsible for implementing the Dublin Convention provisions. Hence, many of these officials fear of becoming a «buffer zone» unless convincing «burden sharing» mechanism is put into place. An additional concern results from doubts about the EU's commitment to an eventual membership. Turkish officials are particularly concerned about lifting the «geographical limitation», a right they enjoy under international law, and then find themselves having to face all the consequences that this would entail in the event of non–membership.

This concern is aggravated by a growing trend in the EU to externalize its asylum policies. The Asylum Procedures Directive adopted in December 2005 opens the way for EU member states to send asylum seekers to a neighboring country designated as a safe third or transit country of asylum. This increases Turkish officials' fears that Turkey will actually be used as a buffer zone by EU member states. This is further aggravated by the European Commission efforts to get Turkey to negotiate and sign a Readmission Agreement. After having faced bitter criticism from the EU and member states Turkey improved its struggle against illegal transit migration over the last couple of years (Gresh, 2005). This was acknowledged in the regular progress reports of the Commission on Turkey. Considerable progress has also been achieved in respect to combating trafficking both at the legislative as well as practical level. However, the pressure to sign a Readmission Agreement with the Commission continues to be a source of tension. One reason has already been mentioned. The other one is that Turkish authorities are desperately trying to negotiate similar agreements with third countries. Turkey signed four such agreements (Greece, Syria, Kyrgyzstan and Romania) and is negotiating with 3 countries and has approached 20 countries for negotiations.[10] Some of the critical countries that are also on the list of the countries that the Thessalonica European Council instructed the Commission to sign readmission agreements have not responded at all. These include China,

---

[9] The Action Plan on «Asylum and Migration» was officially adopted by the Turkish government on 25 March 2005. The English and Turkish versions of the Plan will appear on following web pages: www.unhcr.org.tr, www.deltur.cec.eu.int and www.abgs.gov.tr. *National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis* 2003, Section 24 Justice and Home Affairs, Table 24.1.1 details the task that will be performed for the purposes of harmonization with the EU acquis. Table 24.1.2 lists tasks for the preparation and putting into place the institutional and administrative infrastructure.

[10] Information obtained from the web page of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/TurkiyedeYasadisiGoc/

India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Turkish officials sense a lack of goodwill on the part of the EU that they are being pressured to sign an agreement when even the EU itself is having difficulties signing agreements with these major sources of illegal migrants. This reinforces Turkish officials' fear that the EU intends to use Turkey as a buffer zone if not a dumping ground. An important consequence of an absence in addressing this concern is that it can encourage violations of non–refoulement and/or measures that lead to a chain of readmission agreements that could see an asylum seeker being treated as an illegal migrant and unable to have an application addressed. Furthermore, the pressure to combat with illegal migration seems to be falling in conflict with the EU's simultaneous efforts to encourage putting into place in Turkey an asylum status determination proce-dure that is sensitive to international refugee norms such non–refoulement.

Turkish border
control and visa policies

One last area concerning immigration in EU–Turkish relations is border control and visa policies. Turkey is expected to adopt like the previous candidate countries the Schengen regime before accession. The Turkish NPAA commits itself to adopt-ing the relevant *acquis*. However, there are two aspects to this commitment that needs close consideration. The first one is that Turkish nationals have to have a Schengen visa to enter the EU. This will create a curious situation for a candidate country that implements the Schengen black list but nevertheless itself is on the list too. The practice of the EU with the previous set of candidate countries was to remove the nationals of countries that signed readmission agreements with member states and adopted the EU border control *acquis.* At this point is difficult to tell whether something similar can be envisaged for Turkey.

Turkey has currently a visa regime that has already been at least partly adjusted to the Schengen visa system. However, there are still a number of coun-tries that are black–listed by the Schengen regime whose nationals can enter Turkey without visas or with visas that can easily be obtained from entry points and especially airports. This visa system has played a massive role in dismantling the myths and prejudices that the Iron Curtain had created and has also helped to create growing economic contacts between Turkey and a whole region sur-rounding it (Kirişci, 2005). In others words it can be claimed that this visa regime has assisted «peace–building» in the region. In 1964 when Turkey and the Soviet Union first put into place a possible for their nationals to travel to each other's countries 414 Soviet nationals entered Turkey. This number in 1980 had crept up to just above 40,000 and then to 222,000 after Turkey introduced its current lib-eral visa policy. The figure for 2004 for the ex–Soviet Union geography was just below 2, 8 million entries 1, 6 million being nationals of the Russian Federation

(see Table 13). The full adoption of the Schengen visa regime by Turkey would bring this movement of people to an end and Turkey would also have to take on the massive administrative cost of attempting to process visa applications. This additionally would have to occur in a period when the likelihood of Turkey receiving the kinds of pre–accession funding that new accession countries received is very low. It is highly likely that many interest groups in Turkey as well as in the ex–Soviet world will resist the introduction of the Schengen Visa regime.

TABLE 13

Entry of persons from the Soviet Union and former
Soviet Republics between 1964 and 2005

	1964	1970	1980	1990	1996	2000	2005
Soviet Union	414	4,824	40,015	222,537	–	–	–
Russia	–	–	–	–	1,235,290	677,152	1,855,900
Central Asian Turkic States							
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	–	31,373	38,939	106,167
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	8,052	8,789	31,017
Tajikistan	–	–	–	–	3,087	952	6,811
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	5,035	10,987	34,292
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	–	13,558	21,062	24,634
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	1,296,395	757,881	2,058,821
South Caucasus							
Armenia	–	–	–	–	5,345	17,549	36,633
Azerbaijan	–				100,249	179,878	411,111
Georgia	–				116,709	179,563	367,148
Subtotal	–				222,303	376,990	814,892
Western Newly Independent States (NIS)							
Belarus	–				474	9,622	77,029
Moldova	–				8,290	62,687	89,849
Ukraine	–				93,794	173,551	367,103
Subtotal					102,558	245,860	533,981
Total	414	4,824	40,015	222,537	1,621,256	1,380,731	3,407,694
General total	229,347	724,754	1,057,364	2,301,250	8,538,864	10,428,153	20,275,213

Source: Complied from data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI and
State Statistical Institute Annual Reports.

SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS

Turkey has long been both a country of emigration as well as immigration. Start-
ing from the early 1960s an ever–growing number of Turks has immigrated to
mostly West European countries. Initially, this immigration was driven by labor
demand from the booming European economies. Once these economies began to
stall, demand for Turkish labor fell but immigration mostly through the family
reunification and asylum channels continued. Currently there are about 4 mil-
lion Turkish migrants living in Western Europe. We have begun to talk about the
third generation in Europe. As Turkish migration to Europe has «matured» many
challenges have arisen for the Turkish community. With the changes in the eco-
nomic climate, education issues, lack of language and skill requirements has made
it difficult for the Turks to compete with the natives. Education of the second
generation has not been as successful although there are some promising signs as
there are increasingly more Turkish students entering the university realm. An
important consideration in Turkish migration to Western Europe has been the
«transnational» nature of it. Turks continue to «inhabit» in both their «worlds».
Often they prefer dual citizenship over citizenship of their countries of origin.
Their political organizations frequently reflect the political divisions of Turkey.
The agenda of these organizations is still oriented towards Turkey although it
is possible to observe slowly a change as well. Intermarriage with the natives
is low and continued spouse migration of the second generation has become an
issue for the receiving countries. Satellite television and print media available
in Europe reinforces the interest of the Turkish community in their country of
origin. Remittances have continued to flow to Turkey and to this day represent
an important economic and political link between Turkey and its migrants. At
the same time, however, it can be observed that there is a rise in naturalization,
self–employment, some improvement in educational performance and political
participation as well more of a focus on the politics of the receiving country.

Ultimately, Turkey's experience with immigration as well as emigration
has been a learning experience that has required adjustment and a re–orientation
of «old»–style policies. As Turkey has seen its émigré community in Europe be-
come more permanent, there has been more of a concern about their needs and
an increased understanding of integration challenges. Turkey's «answer» has been
to promote integration of Turks abroad while encouraging them to keep their ties
to the country of origin. Turkey has encouraged dual citizenship advocates the
preservation of Turkish as a language (besides the new languages) and assists
with cultural and religious services via its consulates, embassies and Diyanet, a
governmental institution responsible for religious affairs. In other words, Turkey
has encouraged and promoted the transnational side of Turkish emigration.

Turkey's own immigration policies have been closely related to the Turkish state's conception and understanding of Turkish national identity. The laws and the practice in respect to who could immigrate to Turkey was one that excluded those identities that were deemed by the state unlikely to assimilate or melt into a homogenous Turkish identity. While large numbers of Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, Tatars, Turks etc… mostly from the Balkans were encouraged to immigrate to Turkey, individuals belonging to non–Sunni Muslim minorities, ranging from Armenians and Assyrians to Greek and Jews as well as Kurds found themselves emigrating sometimes as guest workers to Germany and Europe and sometimes as asylum seekers and immigrants. «New» immigration has a very different composition. Many individuals from neighboring countries are entering Turkey increasingly for either short term stays or yet times even for prolonged periods. Many are illegally present in Turkey. There are also large numbers of individuals from distant countries of the Third World transiting Turkey while some either get stranded in Turkey or choose to stay on in Turkey. Their presence more often than not is illegal. Some of these individuals seek asylum in Turkey. Turkey grants them only temporary asylum until the UNHCR can resettle refugees to third countries while the rejected ones are either deported or join the ranks of illegal immigrants in Turkey. There are also a growing number of foreign nationals, many from EU member states, who are settling in Turkey for employment, retirement and other reasons. The rights of such immigrants are much more limited than what their counterparts enjoy in EU countries.

Turkish immigration to Western Europe and the integration challenges Turkish migrants have deeply marked European–Turkish relations. The image of Turkey in the minds of many Europeans has been formed by their encounter with Turkish immigrants. This encounter by and large has been a negative one and exacerbates European fears that Turks will actually invade their societies if Turkey was to become a member of the European Union. It is very telling that the representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (supported by the Christian Democrats in Germany), in Turkey, Frank Spengler, argued that Turkey's membership went not through Diyarbakır but Kreuzberg.[11] Diyarbakır is a mostly Kurdish populated city in Turkey and Kreuzberg on the other hand is a neighborhood of Berlin heavily populated by Turks. This statement was made in the wake of Turkey becoming officially a candidate for the European Union. Ultimately, Turkey became a candidate but according to this quite realistic observation Turkey's eventual membership will be closely associated with the challenges associated with the incorporation of Turkish immigrants into their host societies in Europe.

Turkey's EU candidacy necessitates difficult changes for Turkey's policies in the fields of asylum and immigration. An important EU requirement is that Tur-

---

[11] Reported by Ş. Alpay, «Diyarbakır ya da Kreuzberg», *Zaman,* 27 May 2005.

key lifts the «geographical limitation» with which Turkey had accepted the 1952 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This presents Turkey with the formidable task of developing and implementing an asylum policy in a very difficult and challenging region. Turkey's fears are centered on becoming the «soft belly» a buffer zone of the EU and facing the externalization of policy costs of the EU. There are also somewhat more technical challenges to changing Turkey's visa policies such as the implementation of a Schengen black list although Turkey herself is on it too. Furthermore, Turkey is faced with the difficult task of finalizing readmission agreement with third countries that are the potential source of illegal migration to Europe. This is a task the Union herself has found difficult to accomplish. On the Turkish side the most striking observation is that the Turkish authorities are having not only to revise laws but also a whole attitude towards immigration that once deeply shaped by nation–state building of a past era.

Turkey's EU membership aspirations and the accession process itself have had and will be having a profound impact on not only patterns of immigration and emigration but also on Turkish policy and practice in this area. The position of the Turkish state in respect to this new immigration is deeply marked by the state's conception of Turkish national identity. Yet, the tremendous pace of transformation that Turkey is going through especially in relation to efforts to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and harmonize its legislation with the EU *acquis* are bringing about significant changes to the state conceptualization of Turkish national identity as well as its asylum and immigration policies. In these two areas it is possible to talk about policies and approaches that one could argue amount to a degree of «post–nationalization» (Kirişci, 2006). The elements of this «post–nationalization» are evident in the manner in which Turkish officials are much more willing to cooperate with Turkish and foreign non–governmental organizations, western governments, the European Commission and other international organization such as especially the UNHCR. Furthermore, there is also an effort on the part of the government to adjust its policies closer to that of the EU. This is most conspicuous in the case of the decision to eventually lift the «geographical limitation» to the 1951 Geneva Convention.

The economic growth and stability brought by the EU candidacy is making Turkey increasingly attractive as a country of immigration: an experience that particularly Spain and Greece as well as Ireland went through subsequent to their EU membership. Turkey's efforts to meet the «Copenhagen political criteria» to qualify to begin accession talks has also helped the emergence of a buoyant civil society that is becoming involved in issues to do with asylum, trafficking in women and illegal migration. The Turkish government has also in front of it a long list of tasks that it has to fulfill to harmonize its laws and policies with that of the EU *acquis.* In the meantime Turkish society itself is also becoming much more accustomed to an ethnically and culturally diverse society that includes identities that may not easily be associated with a traditional definition of «Turkishness».

REFERENCES

ABADAN–Unat N. (1977), «Implications of Migration on Emancipation and Pseudoemancipation of Turkish Women», in *International Migration Review*, 11(1).

AKSOY, A. (2000), 'The Possibilities of Transnational Turkish Television', available online http://www.photoinsight.org.uk/text/aksoy/aksoy.pdf.

AKTAR, A. (2001), *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları,* İstanbul, İletişim.

ARAT, Y. (forthcoming), «Contestation and Collaboration: Women's Struggles for Empowerment in Turkey» in Resat Kasaba (ed.) *Cambridge History of Turkey,* Cambridge, Cambrdige University Press.

BALI, R. (2004), *Devlet'in Yahudileri ve «öteki» Yahudi,* Istanbul, Iletisim.

_____ (1999), *Cumhuriyet yillarinda Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türklestirme serüveni (1923–1945)*, Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari.

BAUBÖCK, R. (2006), The Acquisition and Loss of Nationality in Fifteen EU States. Results of the Comparative Project NATAC, http://www.imiscoe.org/workingpapers/documents/natac_policy_brief_nationality.pdf.

BEHAR, C. (2006), «Demographic Developments and 'Complementarities'. Ageing, Labor and Migration», *Turkish Studies*, 7 (1).

BERGER, M. and R. Wolff (2001), *Een gekleurd advies? Een onderzoek naar de participatie van etnische minderheden in landelijke adviescolleges en gemeentelijke overlegstructuren* [A biased advice? Research into the participation of ethnic minorities in national advisory council and municipal communication platforms], Amsterdam, Imes.

_____ *et al*. (2001), *Politieke participatie van etnische minderheden in vier steden* [Political participation of ethnic minorities in four cities], Amsterdam, IMES.

BLOEMRAAD, I. (2003), «Who Claims Dual Citizenship? The Limits of Postnationalism, the Possibilities of Transnationalism, and the Persistence of Traditionalism», *International Migration Review,* 37(4).

BÖCKER, A. (1996), «Refugee and asylum–seeking migration from Turkey to Europe», *Bogaziçi Journal,* 10 (1–2).

CAĞAPTAY, S. (2005), *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?,* London, Routledge.

CAĞLAR, A. (2002), «Mediascapes, Advertisement Industries and Cosmopolitan Transformations: Turkish Immigrants in Europe», Robert Schuman Centre Working Papers No. 2002/53.

CASTLES, S. and M. Miller (2003), *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World,* New York, Palgrave.

COMMISSION of the European Communities (2004), «*Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*», {COM (2004) 656 final}, Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/.

CRUL M. and H. Vermeulen, «Immigration and Education. The Second Generation in Europe», http://www.lisproject.org/immigration/papers/crul.pdf.

_____ (2000) «The Educational Position of the Second Generation in the Netherlands: Results, Career Routes and Explanations», EFFNATIS Working Paper No. 35, available online http://www.uni–bamberg.de/projekte/effnatis/Paper35_IMES.pdf.

_____ (1998) «Onderlinge hulp en schoolsucces van Marokkaanse en Turkse jongeren. Een optimistische visie» (Mutual help and success in school of Moroccan and Turkish youth. An optimistic vision) in I. Van Eerd, and B. Hermes (eds.), *Pluriform Amsterdam,* Amsterdam, Vossiuspers AUP.

DAY, L.H. and A. Icduygu, (1997), «The consequences of international migration for the status of women: A Turkish study», *International Migration,* 35 (1997),

DOOMERNIK, J., «Data Availability for Secondary Analysis in The Netherlands», EFFNATIS Working paper 24, available online http://www.unibamberg. de/projekte/effnatis/Paper24_IMES.pdf.

DRIESSEN, G. and H. Dekkers, (1997), «Educational Opportunities in the Netherlands: Policy, Students' Performance and Issues», *Review of Education*, 43(4).

ERZAN, R., U. Kuzubaş and N. Yıldız, (2006), «Immigration Scenarios: Turkey–EU», *Turkish Studies*, 7 (1).

FENNEMA, M. and J. Tillie, (1999), «Participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks», *Journal of Ethnic and Migrant Studies*, 25(4).

GRESH, G., (2005), «Acquiescing to the *Acquis*: Combating Irregular Migration in Turkey», *Insight Turkey*, 7(2).

GUARNIZO, L.E., (2001), «On the Political Participation of Transnational Migrants: Old Practices and New Trends», in Gerstle and Mollenkopf.

GLICK Schiller, N., (1999), «Transmigrants and Nation–States: Something Old and Something New in the U.S. Immigrant Experience», in Ch. Hirschman, Ph. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind (eds.), *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* New York, Russell Sage.

HARMSEN, C.D., (1999), «Cross–Cultural Marriages», *Monthly Bulletin of Population Statistics*, Voorburg/Heerlen, Statistics Netherlands.

IÇDUYGU, A., (2006), «International Migrants Remittances in Turkey», available online http://www.carim.org/Publications/CARIM–AS06_07–Icduygu.pdf.

Jones–Correa, M., «The 'Return' of the State: Immigration, Transnationalism, and Dual Nationality», available online http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/publications/revista/latinos/jonescorrea.htm.

KADIOGLU, A., (1994), «The impact of migration on gender roles: findings of field research in Turkey» *International Migration*, 32(4).

KAISER, B., (2003), «Life worlds of EU immigrants in Turkey», in E. Zeybekoglu

and B. Johansson (eds.), *Migration and labour in Europe*. Istanbul: MURCIR and NIWL).

KIRIŞCI, K. (2000), «Disaggregating Turkish citizenship and immigration practices», *Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (3).

_____ (2005), «A friendlier Schengen visa system as a tool of 'soft power': The experience of Turkey», *European Journal of Migration and Law* 7 (4).

_____ (2006), «National Identity, Asylum and Immigration: EU as a vehicle of 'post–national' transformation in Turkey», in Hans–Lukas Kieser, (ed.), *Turkey: Nationalism, Post–Nationalism and the European Community.* London, I.B. Taurus.

KUMCU, M.E. (1989), «The Savings Behavior of Migrant Workers: Turkish Workers» in W. Germany, *Journal of Development–Economics*, 30.

LAW, No. 403, (1964), Turkish Nationality Law 1964.

_____, No. 2383, (1981), Turkish Nationality Law, 1981.

_____, No. 4112, (1995), Turkish Nationality Law, 1995.

LEVITT, P. (2001), *The Transnational Villagers*, Berkeley, University of California.

LINDO, F. (2000), «Does culture explain? Understanding differences in school attainment between Iberian and Turkish youth in the Netherlands», in H. Vermeulen and J. Perlmann, (eds.), *Immigrants, schooling and social mobility. Does culture make a difference,¿* London, MacMillan.

MICHON, L. and J. Tillie (2003), *Amsterdamse polyfonie: opkomst en stemmgedrag bij de gemeenteraads– en deelraadsverkiezingen van 6 maart 2002* (Amsterdam polyphonics: electoral turnout and voting behavior at municipal elections of March 6, 2002), Amsterdam, IMES.

MILLIKOWSKI, M. (1999), Stoorzender of katalysator? Turkse satelliet tv in Nederland, (Interfering or catalyst? Turkish satellite TV in the Netherlands), *Migrantenstudies*, 15(3).

MORAWSKA, E. (2001), «Immigrants, Transnationalism, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of This Great Wave and the Last», in G. Gerstle and J.H. Mollenkopf, (eds.), *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation,* New York, Russell Sage.

ODE, A. (2002), *Ethnic–cultural and socio–economic integration in the Netherlands: A comparative study of Mediterranean and Caribbean minority groups*, Assen, Van Gorcum.

OGAN, Ch. (2001), *Communication and Identity in the Diaspora: Turkish Migrants in Amsterdam and their Use of Media,* Lanham Maryland, Lexington Books.

ØSTERGAARD–Nielsen, E.K. (2000), «Trans–State Loyalties and Politics of Turks and Kurds in Western Europe», *SAIS Review,* 20(1).

ÖGELMAN N. (2003), «Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics Among Germany's Turks», *International Migration Review,* 37(1).

_____, J. Money, and Ph. Martin (2002), «Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Influencing Foreign Policy», *SAIS Review* XXII(2).

ÖZCAN, V. and J. Soehn (2006), «The Educational Attainment of Turkish Migrants in Germany», *Turkish Studies* 7(1).

PROJECT Hermes at http://www.quest–et.org/ec/issues.asp?mode=turkish_comm

Punch, A. and David Pierce (eds.) (2000), *Europe's Population and Labour Market beyond 2000*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications.

SHAW, S. (1991), *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic,* New York, New York Univ. Press.

SOCIAAL Cultureel Planbureau (1998), *Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1998.25 Jaar Sociale Verandering* (Social and Cultural Report 1998: 25 years of social change), The Hague, SCP.

STARING, R. and S. Zorlu (1996), «Thuis voor de buis: Turkse migranten en satelliet–teevee» (At home in front of the TV: Turkish migrants and satellite TV), *Migrantenstudies,* 12 (4).

STRAUBHAAR, T. (1986), «The Determinants of Workers' Remittances: The Case of Turkey», *Weltwirtschafliches Archiv,* 122.

SWAMY, G. (1984), Population and International Migration. Washington, D.C., The World Bank.

TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly), (2004), «Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurtulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu», T.B.M.M., Session 22, Number 335, Legislative Year 2, 17 December 2004.

_____ (2003), *Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu* (Report prepared by the Parliamentary Commission set up to study the problems of Turkish nationals living abroad and to determine the measures to be adopted), Turkish Grand National Assembly, Legislative Session: 22, Legislative Year, 2, December 17, 2003.

TIMMERMAN, Ch. (2006), «Gender Dynamics in the Context of Turkish Marriage Migration: The Case of Belgium», *Turkish Studies*, March, 7(1).

VAN den Tillaart H. (2001), *Monitor Etnisch Ondernemerschap: Zelfstandig Ondernemerschap van Etnische Minderheden in Nederland in de Periode 1990–2000* (Monitor Ethnic Entrepreneurship: Independent entrepreneurship of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands from 1990–2000), Nijmegen, ITS. These figures refer to first–generation immigrants only.

VAN Heelsum, A. & J. Tillie (2000), *Turkse organisaties in Nederland*, Amsterdam: Spinhuis Publishers.

UNHCR, (2000), *The state of the world's refugees: Fifty years of humanitarian action,* New York, Oxford Univ. Press, Annex 10.

VELDKAMP Marktonderzoek, (1995), *Media–onderzoek etnische groepen 1995 (Media research ethnic groups 1995),* Amsterdam, Veldkamp.

_____ (1999), «Mediagebruik etnische publieksgroepen–1998», (Media Consumption among ethnic groups–1998), Amsterdam, Veldkamp.

VERMEULEN, F. (2002), «Immigration Policy and Ethnic Organizations in Amsterdam, 1960–1990: A Local Historical Approach», Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research meeting in Turin, 22–27 March.

Vernant, J. (1953), *The Refugee in the post–war, London*, George Allen and Unwin.

YALÇIN–Heckmann, L. (1998), «The perils of associational life in Europe: Turkish migrants in Germany and France», in Tariq Madood and Pnina Werbner, (eds), *The politics of multiculturalism in New Europe.* London, Zed Books.

ZENTRUM für Türkeistudien (1999), *Die Regionalen Transferstellen für ausländischeExistenzgründer und Unternehmer in Nordrhein Westphalen. Ökonomische Daten der türkischen und ausländischen Selbständigen in NRW und Deutschland* (Regional transfer offices for foreign startups and entrepreneurs in Nordrhein Westphalia, Economic data of Turkish and foreign entrepreneurs in NRW and Germany), Essen, Zentrum für Türkeistudien.